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What Has Twenty-Five Years of Racial
Gerrymandering Doctrine Achieved?
Michael J. Pitts*
In 1993, Shaw v. Reno created a doctrine of racial gerrymandering
that has now been in existence for twenty-five years. This Article
examines the doctrine’s impact over that time—whether it has achieved
the goals the Court set out for the doctrine in Shaw and whether it has
had other consequences. This Article examines the doctrine’s impact
through the lens of the place where the doctrine first took root and has
been most heavily litigated over the last twenty-five years—North
Carolina’s congressional districts. This Article also draws upon the
existing empirical literature in its assessment of the doctrine’s impact. In
so doing, this Article represents the first comprehensive assessment of the
doctrine. Ultimately, the Article concludes that while more research could
and should be done in this realm, racial gerrymandering doctrine does
not appear to have achieved the goals the Court set out for it. In addition,
the doctrine has likely had little additional impact other than to make
districts more compact and cost state governments money for litigation
and compliance. For these reasons, the Article concludes that the doctrine
should be abandoned absent additional research documenting a
systematically meaningful positive impact on American democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court handed down the watershed
decision of Shaw v. Reno.1 Shaw involved a challenge to two congressional districts
in North Carolina drawn for the purpose of allowing African-American voters the
ability to control the outcome of elections in those districts.2 A group of white
plaintiffs challenged those districts, asserting a constitutional claim that had never
before been recognized—a claim of racial gerrymandering.3 A narrow majority of
the Supreme Court embraced the justiciability of such a claim.4 New constitutional
doctrine was born.
The doctrine, which makes it unconstitutional to draw a single-member district
using race as the predominant factor unless the district satisfies strict scrutiny,5 has
had an interesting run so far. It spawned a wave of litigation during the 1990s
involving congressional and state legislative redistricting plans.6 Indeed, it is not an
exaggeration to say that racial gerrymandering doctrine was to election law what
Nirvana’s “Nevermind” was to rock music during the 1990s—the groundbreaking
moment of the decade. But as we moved past the millennium, the doctrine went
dormant, with little activity of note during the Aughts.7 Then, the 2010 round of
1. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2. Id. at 634–37.
3. Id. at 636–37.
4. Id. at 658.
5. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1262, slip op. at 2 (S. Ct. May 22, 2017).
6. The Supreme Court used racial gerrymandering doctrine to reject several congressional plans
during the 1990s round of redistricting. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (Texas congressional);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (North Carolina congressional); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995) (Georgia congressional). Lower federal courts also used racial gerrymandering doctrine to strike
down congressional and state legislative redistricting plans in several states. See, e.g., Kelley v. Bennett,
96 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (Alabama State House and Senate), vacated for lack of standing
sub nom, Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(Virginia congressional); Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (New York congressional);
Johnson v. Morthem, 926 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (Florida congressional); Hays v. Louisiana,
936 F. Supp. 360 ( W.D. La. 1996) (Louisiana congressional); Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174
(D.S.C. 1996) (South Carolina State House and Senate). In a few instances, redistricting plans
survived racial gerrymandering challenges. See, e.g., King v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 619
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (Illinois congressional), aff’d, 522 U.S. 1087 (1998); DeWitt v. Wilson, 856
F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (California congressional), aff’d, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
7. Jocelyn F. Benson, A Shared Existence: The Current Compatibility of the Equal Protection
Clause and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 88 NEB. L. REV. 124, 151 (2009) (“[ I ]n each state subject
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redistricting sparked a revitalization that included a major Supreme Court opinion
involving the very same North Carolina congressional districts that spawned the
doctrine’s creation in the first place.8
When it conceived the doctrine of racial gerrymandering, the Court clearly
articulated two goals for the doctrine—one involving its impact on voters and the
other its impact on candidates. First, the Court expressed a view that the doctrine
could foster a political environment with less racially polarized voting.9 Second, the
Court thought the doctrine would lead to the election of government officials who
would serve their constituency more holistically.10 In addition, the Court also
expressed a third, more nebulous and vague concern about stereotyping.11
After such a big run in the 1990s and with twenty-five years of
implementation, one might expect the development of a rich literature assessing
racial gerrymandering doctrine’s impact on American democracy during its lifespan.
But that hasn’t happened. There appears to have been little, if any, systematic study
about whether racial gerrymandering doctrine has achieved the goals articulated by
the Court in 1993.12 And there also does not appear to have been any systematic
study of whether racial gerrymandering doctrine has led to other developments not
articulated by the Court—such as reduced representation for minority voters or the
enactment of less partisan redistricting plans.
This Article fills a hole in the racial gerrymandering literature by conducting a
systematic review of the impact of the doctrine, and it does so in two parts. Part I
tells the broad outlines of the story of racial gerrymandering doctrine in relation to
North Carolina’s congressional districts over the past quarter century. The story is
a fascinating one in that the districts originally alleged to be racial gerrymanders in
the early 1990s that sparked creation of the doctrine then faced the exact same
allegations two decades later, playing a role in the doctrine’s revival. Part II then
uses North Carolina’s congressional redistricting saga, along with existing empirical
evidence, to assess the doctrine’s impact.

to Section 5 preclearance there was not one single case in which a federal court found that a districting
plan drawn after the 2000 Census violated [racial gerrymandering] doctrine.”).
8. Cooper, slip op. at 5. For other post-2010 racial gerrymandering opinions from the Supreme
Court, see Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) (challenge to state legislative
districts in Virginia); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015) (racial
gerrymandering challenge to Alabama state legislative districts). For a lower court decision rejecting
several state legislative districts as racial gerrymanders, see Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama,
231 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
9. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
10. Id. at 648.
11. Id. at 647.
12. As some of the only researchers to specifically study the impact of racial gerrymandering
doctrine wrote in 2015: “To date, though, we are unaware of any attempt, like ours, to assess the
empirical assumptions undergirding the Shaw theory of majority-minority districting and its
psychological effects.” Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do MajorityMinority Districts Cause Expressive Harms?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1041, 1046 (2015).
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After engaging in this systematic review, the Article comes to the following
conclusions:
 Racial gerrymandering doctrine likely has done little to advance the
explicit goals articulate by the Court when it created the doctrine.
 The doctrine likely has had very little impact on the descriptive or
substantive representation of minority voters.13 To the extent it has
had an impact on descriptive representation, it may have reduced it
slightly although there is no evidence that this slight reduction has led
to much of an increase in substantive representation.
 The doctrine has likely done little to curb partisan gerrymandering.
 The doctrine has likely had little impact on individual voter
participation.
 The doctrine has likely done little to advance state’s rights,
democratic legitimacy, or a “colorblind” constitution.
 The doctrine has likely led to more compact districts.
 The doctrine has likely increased litigation and compliance costs for
state and local governments.
In the end, if this is what the doctrine does, the most tangible benefit14 of the
doctrine—more compact districts—probably does not outweigh the increased costs
to government of litigating such claims.
A caveat, though, before proceeding. While this Article concludes that racial
gerrymandering doctrine likely has had little impact on American democracy during
its twenty-five-year run, further study could prove some of the above conclusions
incorrect. There has been relatively little direct empirical work on the doctrine’s
impact. Thus, while discussing the doctrine’s impact, this Article will also point out
areas where additional empirical research might be done. At the very least, though,
this Article would seem to shift the burden to supporters of the doctrine to justify
its practical utility.
I. THE STORY OF RACIAL GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS IN NORTH CAROLINA
The tale of racial gerrymandering involving North Carolina’s congressional
districts over the last quarter-century is incredible. Two districts drawn in the early
1990s sparked litigation resulting in four Supreme Court opinions, the first of which
created a brand-new constitutional doctrine. Then, the same two districts were
reconstructed in 2011, sparking yet another racial gerrymandering decision from the
Supreme Court related to North Carolina’s congressional districts. Because the level
of racial gerrymandering activity has been amazing, North Carolina’s congressional

13. For definitions of the terms “descriptive” and “substantive” representation, see discussion
infra Part II.B.
14. Assuming it is a benefit, see infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
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districts serve as a wonderful launching pad for discussing the doctrine’s impact.15
What follows is a discussion of the two separate decades of litigation that
intersperses electoral results from the myriad of congressional redistricting plans
used in North Carolina over the past twenty-five years.
A. The 1990 Round of Racial Gerrymandering Litigation
The 1990 Census showed North Carolina’s population had grown in such a
way as to entitle the State to an additional Congressional district—it’s twelfth.16 The
Democratic Party controlled the redistricting process,17 and the State’s first attempt
at redistricting resulted in the creation of one majority-black district in the
northeastern portion of the State. In the eyes of some, this district was constructed
in a “contorted” manner for partisan purposes—to protect white Democratic
members of Congress from potentially being defeated by Republicans, the latter of
whom had been gaining strength in state politics over the previous couple of
decades.18
The State’s initial redistricting plan was denied preclearance by the United
States Department of Justice under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.19 The Justice
Department objected to North Carolina’s redistricting because North Carolina had
failed to draw two majority-black districts.20 In the Justice Department’s view, the
State had engaged in impermissible purposeful discrimination by refusing to
establish a second majority-black district.21 The Justice Department’s denial of
preclearance sent North Carolina back to the drawing board.
North Carolina’s legislature responded to the Justice Department by enacting
a redistricting plan with two majority-black districts—District 1 and District 12.22
District 1 was described as:
somewhat hook shaped. Centered in the northeastern portion of the State,
it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like
extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the
15. As one commentator observed: “Few states have had as great an impact on the development
of redistricting and election law as North Carolina.” Benson, supra note 7, at 154. And that observation
occurred prior to the litigation involving the post-2010 Census redistricting in North Carolina.
16. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C. 1992).
17. Id. at 394. At the time, the Governor was a Republican; however, the Governor did not
have veto power. Id.
18. Id. at 394; see also Thomas C. Goldstein, Unpacking and Applying Shaw v. Reno, 43
AM. U. L. REV. 1135, 1147 (1994) (“A . . . concern for the predominantly Democratic General Assembly
was its partisan desire to see members of the Democratic party elected from the state by designing most
of the districts to include a majority of Democratic voters.”); Paul Gronke & J. Matthew Wilson,
Competing Redistricting Plans as Evidence of Political Motives, 27 AM. POL. Q. 147, 152 (1999) (noting
that North Carolina’s redistricting process occurred in the context of a “state [that had] turned
progressively more Republican”).
19. Letter of John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Tiare B. Smiley,
Special Deputy Attorney Gen., State of N.C. (Dec. 18, 1991) [hereinafter “Dunne Letter”].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634–35 (1993).
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South Carolina border. District 1 has been compared to a “Rorschach inkblot test” . . . and a “bug splattered on a windshield.”23
District 12 was described as:
even more unusually shaped [than District 1]. [District 12] is approximately
160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the I-85 corridor.
It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers,
and manufacturing areas “until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black
neighborhoods.” Northbound and southbound drivers on I-85 sometimes
find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to “trade” districts
when they enter the next county. Of the 10 counties through which District
12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. At
one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a
single point with two other districts before crossing over them. One state
legislator has remarked that “‘[i]f you drove down the interstate with both
car doors open, you’d kill most of the people in the district.’”24
But eye-pleasing cartography did not matter to the Justice Department and,
with a second majority-black district contained in the plan, the Justice Department
was satisfied and granted preclearance.25
Litigation ensued. But the initial litigation related to partisan, not racial,
gerrymandering. A group of mostly Republican plaintiffs filed suit primarily alleging
that North Carolina’s redistricting plan amounted to an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander.26 A three-judge district court quickly dispatched the partisan
gerrymandering claim, and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed that decision.27
The next round of litigation, though, was anything but quick. A group of white
plaintiffs filed a challenge, the “gravamen” of which was that the State “acted
unconstitutionally in deliberately creating two congressional districts in which black
persons constitute[d] majorities of the overall voting-age and registered voter
populations.”28 The most important of these claims was an Equal Protection Clause
allegation of “racial gerrymandering,” focusing on the creation of Districts 1 and

23. Id. at 636 (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 635–36 (internal citations omitted).
25. Id. at 636.
26. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394, 395 ( W.D.N.C. 1992); Richard L. Hasen, Racial
Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 67 ALA. L. REV. 365, 369 (2015) (“In the 1990s round of state
legislative redistricting in North Carolina, self-interested Democrats reacted to the DOJ’s demands to
create an additional majority-minority legislative district by passing a plan that simultaneously created
the required number of such districts, protected Democratic incumbents, and maximized the number
of Democratic seats.”).
27. Pope, 804 F. Supp. at 396–99, aff’d 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). A three-judge panel is convened
whenever the constitutionality of a congressional redistricting plan is challenged. 28 U.S.C. § 2284
(2012). The district court decision then can be directly appealed to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253
(2012).
28. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 467 (E.D.N.C. 1992). The plaintiffs did not self-identify as
“white voters” but the district court took judicial notice of that fact. Id. at 470.
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12.29 A three-judge district court rejected the plaintiffs’ contentions because they
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, with the district court
supporting its reasoning primarily by relying upon Supreme Court precedent.30
With both initial attempts at litigation unsuccessful at the district court level,
the 1992 congressional elections were held using the redistricting plan that had been
precleared by the Justice Department. The 1992 contests resulted in the election of
eight Democrats and four Republicans.31 Importantly, two of the Democrats
elected were African American, marking the first time since 1901 that African
Americans from North Carolina would serve in Congress.32 Unsurprisingly, these
two African-American members of Congress were elected from Districts 1 and 12.33
After the 1992 election, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s
decision rejecting the plaintiffs’ challenge to North Carolina’s plan. In doing so, the
Supreme Court created a new, “analytically distinct” cause of action of
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.34 The Court’s decision was limited to
whether the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim, not whether North Carolina’s
two majority-minority districts were actually unconstitutional.35 In the Court’s view,
the plaintiffs could state a claim “by alleging that the [redistricting] legislation,
though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that
the separation lacks sufficient justification.”36
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court, and in 1994 the
district court once again upheld North Carolina’s plan.37 The district court found
that Districts 1 and 12 had been deliberately drawn so that African-American
citizens had a voting majority and, therefore, subjected those districts to strict
scrutiny.38 But the district court then held that both congressional districts satisfied
strict scrutiny because the state had a compelling interest in complying with the
29. Id. at 468, 473 (describing importance of Equal Protection claim and using the phrase “racial
gerrymandering” to describe the claim).
30. Id. at 470–73 (relying heavily on United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)).
31. MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1788–1997: THE
OFFICIAL RESULTS 782 (1998).
32. Black-American Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870–Present, U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/
BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-Congress/ [https://perma.cc/
L6LK-NYGW] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (list of African-American representatives that shows
Rep. George White as serving North Carolina until 1901 and listing Reps. Eva Clayton and Mel Watt
as being elected in 1992).
33. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 1151 (“In the 1992 congressional elections, North Carolina’s
first black representatives since Reconstruction were elected from district 1 and district 12.”).
34. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993).
35. Id. at 634 (“The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim.”).
36. Id. at 649; see also id. at 642 (noting plaintiffs had objected to “redistricting legislation that is
so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races
for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently
compelling justification”).
37. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 475 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
38. Id. at 473–74.
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Voting Rights Act and because the districts were narrowly tailored to serve that
compelling interest.39
Having withstood the constitutional challenge in the district court, the State
once again held elections in 1994 using the plan that had been precleared by the
Justice Department. The results of that election were the same as the 1992 election
in terms of the delegation’s racial composition, as two of the twelve candidates
elected were African American.40 However, the partisan composition of the
delegation changed dramatically, jumping from four to eight Republican members,
following the national trend of the so-called “Republican Revolution.”41
Despite two elections being held, litigation continued over the plan and, for
the second time, the Supreme Court considered North Carolina’s districts from a
racial gerrymandering perspective.42 The Court did not make a determination on
the merits of the racial gerrymandering claim against District 1, holding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge that district.43 But, as to District 12, the Court
held that race was the predominant factor in its construction because of the district’s
highly irregular shape, its demographics, and the State’s own concessions that the
principal reason for drawing District 12 was to create a majority-black district.44
Despite the State’s contention that other factors played a role in District 12’s
creation, the Court noted that “[r]ace was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could
not be compromised; respecting communities of interest and protecting
Democratic incumbents came into play only after the race-based decision had been
made.”45 The Court then held that District 12 flunked strict scrutiny for three
reasons:
 First, District 12 was not designed to eradicate the effects of past
racial discrimination, so eradicating the effects of past racial
discrimination could not serve as a compelling interest.46
 Second, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act did not require drawing
District 12 because the Justice Department was pursuing a “policy of
maximizing the number of majority-black districts” and this
“maximization policy” was not properly grounded in Section 5. Thus,
compliance with Section 5 could not be a compelling interest.47
 Third, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not require drawing
District 12 because a Section 2 plaintiff would have to demonstrate
the minority group was “geographically compact” and District 12 was
39. Id. at 473–75.
40. DUBIN, supra note 31, at 793 (showing Reps. Eva Clayton, District 1, and Mel Watt, District
12, were returned to office).
41. Id. (providing election results).
42. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
43. Id. at 904.
44. Id. at 905–06.
45. Id. at 907.
46. Id. at 909–10.
47. Id. at 912–13.
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not geographically compact. Thus, District 12 was not narrowly
tailored to address any potential violation of Section 2.48
The Supreme Court’s decision occurred in June of 1996 but the district court
allowed the 1996 elections to be conducted using the plan that the Supreme Court
held to be unconstitutional.49 At these elections, two African-American candidates
were again elected from Districts 1 and 12.50 Democrats, however, reclaimed a
couple of seats from the Republicans, resulting in an even 6-6 partisan split of the
State’s delegation.51
While the district court allowed the 1996 elections to go forward using an
unconstitutional plan, the district court also ordered the State to draw a new map
for the 1998 elections.52 In 1997, the State enacted a new plan that redrew District
12.53 The Supreme Court described the new District 12 as follows:
By any measure, blacks no longer constitute a majority of District 12:
Blacks now account for approximately 47% of the district’s total
population, 43% of its voting age population, and 46% of registered voters.
The new District 12 splits 6 counties as opposed to 10; beginning with
Guilford County, the district runs in a southwestern direction through
parts of Forsyth, Davidson, Rowan, Iredell, and Mecklenburg Counties,
picking up concentrations of urban populations in Greensboro and High
Point (both in Guilford), Winston–Salem (Forsyth), and Charlotte
(Mecklenburg). (The old District 12 went through the same six counties
but also included portions of Durham, Orange, and Alamance Counties
east of Guilford, and parts of Gaston County west of Mecklenburg.) With
these changes, the district retains only 41.6% of its previous area, and the
distance between its farthest points has been reduced to approximately 95
miles. But while District 12 is wider and shorter than it was before, it retains
its basic “snakelike” shape and continues to track Interstate 85.54
A new lawsuit was filed against the 1997 plan and the district court enjoined
use of that plan, finding it to be a racial gerrymander.55 As a result of the district
court’s order, the state drew yet another plan to use at the 1998 elections that once

48. Id. at 914–18.
49. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the New
Millenium, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 261 (2001) (“The district court permitted the State to hold
the 1996 elections under the 1992 plan, but enjoined further use of the plan in future elections.”);
Redistricting Archives, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www2.ncleg.net/RnR/Redistricting/Archives
[https://perma.cc/R74Y-XVRT] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) (noting that the 1992 plan was used for
elections from 1992 to 1996).
50. DUBIN, supra note 31, at 804.
51. Id.
52. North Carolina Redistricting Cases: The 1990s, MINN. SENATE, https://www.senate.mn/
departments/scr/REDIST/Redsum/ncsum.htm [https://perma.cc/4Z5U-CALD] (last updated July
8, 2003).
53. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 543 (1999).
54. Id. at 544 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 545.

First to Printer_Pitts (Do Not Delete)

238

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/3/2018 11:00 AM

[ Vol. 9:229

again modified the boundaries of District 12.56 The 1998 elections again produced
a delegation with two African-American representatives.57 Republicans also gained
a seat at the 1998 elections, leaving the State’s delegation at a 7-5 split in favor of
the GOP.58
The district court’s decision finding the 1997 version of District 12
unconstitutional rested on several grounds. First, the district was unusually shaped
and lacked compactness.59 Second, where cities and counties were split by District
12, the splits occurred along racial rather than political lines.60 Third, racial motives
predominated over political motives because District 12 excluded white Democratic
precincts.61 Fourth, a statement by a leading Senator spoke of “racial and partisan
balance” and an email from a line-drawer referenced sections of Greensboro as
“Black.”62 Finally, the State presented no compelling interest for drawing District
12 and, even if it had, District 12 was not narrowly tailored.63
The district court’s decision came in early 2000 (the timing may seem odd, see
the footnote for an explanation),64 but the 2000 elections were held using the 1997
plan that had been declared to be a racial gerrymander by the district court because
the Supreme Court had issued a stay of the district court’s judgment.65 Yet the
results using the 1997 Plan were exactly the same as the previous results using the
1998 Plan. Two African-American Democrats, three white Democrats, and seven
Republicans were elected to Congress.66
Even though the millennium had arrived with new census data set for release
that guaranteed a new round of redistricting, litigation over North Carolina’s
District 12 continued. And the Supreme Court once again reversed the district
56. Id. at 545 n.1.
57. Black-American Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870–Present, supra note 33
(showing election of Reps. Clayton and Watt).
58. JEFF TRANDAHL, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER
3, 1998, at 33 (1999), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/1998election/
[https://perma.cc/G92R-5J5T].
59. Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 418–19 (E.D.N.C. 2000).
60. Id. at 419.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 420.
63. Id. In the same opinion, the district court concluded that District 1 was not a racial
gerrymander because even though it was drawn with race as the predominant factor, it was narrowly
tailored to meet the compelling interest of compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at
421–23.
64. A quick note about the procedural history. The district court initially ruled in April 1998 on
summary judgment that District 12 was unconstitutional. Id. at 409 (describing procedural history). The
Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and ordered that a trial be held. Hunt
v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 554 (1999). The district court then held a trial and issued a second opinion
in which it once again found District 12 to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Cromartie, 133
F. Supp. 2d at 420.
65. North Carolina Redistricting Cases: The 1990s, supra note 53 (issuance of stay by Supreme
Court); Redistricting Archives, supra note 50 (noting that the 1997 plan was used for the 2000 election).
66. JEFF TRANDAHL, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER
7, 2000, at 48 ( 2001), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2000election/
[https://perma.cc/6QLR-H6NM].
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court.67 In so doing, the Court held that the district court’s finding of a racial
gerrymander was clearly erroneous because the district court had incorrectly found
that race rather than politics explained District 12’s boundaries.68 In contrast to the
district court, the Supreme Court exhaustively catalogued the evidence and
concluded that District 12 primarily resulted from a legislative attempt to create a
safe Democratic seat and protect incumbent members of Congress.69 Moreover, the
Court held that plaintiffs challenging the district failed to present a feasible
alternative plan:
[The District Court cited to evidence] that there are other ways in which
the legislature could have created a safely Democratic district without
placing so many primarily African-American districts within District 12.
And we recognize that some such other ways may exist. But, unless the
evidence also shows that these hypothetical alternative districts would have
better satisfied the legislature’s other nonracial political goals as well as
traditional nonracial districting principles, this fact alone cannot show an
improper legislative motive.70
And with that decision, the first era of North Carolina congressional racial
gerrymandering litigation came to a conclusion about a decade after it began.
B. The 2010 Round of Racial Gerrymandering Litigation
The 1990s witnessed a robust cycle of litigation involving racial
gerrymandering and congressional districts; the 2000 redistricting cycle was the
polar opposite. As it had in 1990, the State gained a congressional seat as a result of
apportionment.71 The Democratic Party again controlled the redistricting process,
drew two districts (Districts 1 and 12) to allow African-American voters to elect
candidates of choice, and drew the newly added congressional district in such a way
as to elect a Democrat.72 The result of the first election under that plan was a
67. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237, 241 (2001).
68. Id. at 237, 243–44.
69. Id. at 244, 248.
70. Id. at 249. The lack of a viable alternative was re-emphasized at the conclusion of the Court’s
opinion:
We can put the matter more generally as follows: In a case such as this one where majorityminority districts (or the approximate equivalent) are at issue and where racial identification
correlates highly with political affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn
boundaries must show at least that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political
objective in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional redistricting
principles. That party must also show that those districting alternatives would have brought
about significantly greater racial balance. Appellees failed to make any such showing here.
Id. at 258.
71. Table 1. Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, by State: Census 2000,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2000), https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/maps/files/
tab01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLP7-8V9C].
72. John Mercurio, Between the Lines, R OLL C ALL (Dec. 10, 2001),
http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/ncnews4.htm [https://perma.cc/EL7TFNVK] (describing how the Democrats controlled the legislature and how the 13th District
was a “Democratic stronghold”); John Mercurio, Between the Lines, ROLL CALL (Dec. 3, 2001),
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congressional delegation of six Democrats, two of whom were African American,
and seven Republicans.73 Throughout the decade, Democrats continued to hold
between six and eight of the congressional seats,74 and there was no racial
gerrymandering litigation in relation to North Carolina’s congressional districts.75
But quiet on the racial gerrymandering front lasted for merely one redistricting
cycle. In the 2010 election, Republicans captured the state legislature for the first
time since 1870, thus securing control of the redistricting process.76 They inherited
a political scene where Democrats, including two African-American Democrats,
held seven of thirteen seats.77
As expected, the Republican-dominated legislature drew a plan that
advantaged Republicans at the 2012 elections.78 Republicans captured nine seats at
the 2012 elections.79 The Democrats, including two African-American Democrats
elected from Districts 1 and 12, won just four seats. And at the 2014 elections,
Republicans tacked on another victory, increasing their advantage in the
congressional delegation to 10-3.80
http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/reports/remanual/ncnews4.htm [https://perma.cc/EL7TFNVK] (describing how the legislature designed a plan that protected all incumbents).
73. JEFF TRANDAHL, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER
5, 2002, at 35 (2003), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2002election/
[https://perma.cc/4XDP-H2N7]. Rep. Watt continued to be elected from District 12. Id. Rep. Frank
W. Ballance, Jr., an African American, replaced Rep. Clayton in District 1. Black-American Representatives
and Senators by Congress, 1870–Present, supra note 33. Rep. Ballance, however, was soon replaced by
Rep. G.K. Butterfield, Jr. Id.
74. The seven-six Republican-Democrat split persisted after the 2004 election. JEFF
TRANDAHL, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2004 ( 2005),
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2004election/ [https://perma.cc/KQB24WH6]. In 2006, Democrats gained one seat. LORRAINE C. MILLER, STATISTICS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 7, 2006, at 34 (2007), http://history.house.gov/
Institution/Election-Statistics/2006election/ [https://perma.cc/ZK48-2VS5]. In 2008, Democrats
gained another seat. LORRAINE C. MILLER, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
OF NOVEMBER 4, 2008, at 49 ( 2009), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/
2008election/ [https://perma.cc/P8ZG-3YUM].
75. Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1262, slip op. at 5 (S. Ct. May 22, 2017).
76. Michael Kent Curtis, Using the Voting Rights Act to Discriminate: North Carolina’s Use of
Racial Gerrymanders, Two Racial Quotas, Safe Harbors, Shields, and Inoculations to Undermine Multiracial
Coalitions and Black Political Power, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 421, 433 (2016) (noting that “[t]he
Republican Party won a smashing victory in the 2010 off-year election” and that “the legislators elected
in 2010 would be responsible for the drawing of the new districts for North Carolina’s congressional
delegation”). In North Carolina, the governor does not play a role in the passage of redistricting
legislation.
77. KAREN L. HAAS, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER
2, 2010, at 37 ( 2011), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2010election/
[https://perma.cc/5NZY-RVYW].
78. Curtis, supra note 76, at 424 (describing the post-2010 Census plan as a “Republican
gerrymander”).
79. KAREN L. HAAS, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER
6, 2012, at 46 (2013), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2012election/
[https://perma.cc/K62C-WR9J].
80. KAREN L. HAAS, STATISTICS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER
4, 2014, at 36 (2015), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/2014election/
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Democrats, though, successfully challenged the Republican plan by getting a
federal district court to rule in 2016 that North Carolina’s Districts 1 and 12
amounted to racial gerrymanders.81 The district court’s racial gerrymandering
decision was primarily informed by the following:
 An extraordinary amount of direct evidence that a “racial quota, or
floor, of 50-percent-plus-one-person was established for [District]
1.”82
 To achieve the goal of a majority-minority district, District 1 “not
only subordinated traditional race-neutral principles but disregarded
certain principles such as respect for political subdivisions and
compactness.”83
 Statements indicating District 12 was intentionally drawn as a
majority-minority district.84
 The lack of compactness of District 12.85
 Failure to meet the test for strict scrutiny: (a) because the defendants
did not provide a compelling interest for District 12; and (b) because
District 1 did not need to be a majority-minority district for North
Carolina to comply with the Voting Rights Act.86
After finding the plan to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, the district
court ordered the State to draw a remedial plan.87 About two weeks after the district
court order, the Republican legislature adopted a new plan.88 A key legislator who
drafted the remedial plan “‘acknowledge[d] freely that [the plan] would be a political
gerrymander’” and the plaintiffs who brought the original racial gerrymandering
claim argued the remedial map was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.89 But
the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering objection and
allowed the plan to be implemented at the 2016 election.90
The results from the 2016 election using the remedial plan were the same as
the results from the 2014 election using the racially gerrymandered plan. The

[https://perma.cc/Z3C6-6NH3]. In 2014, African American Rep. Alma Adams was elected from
District 12. Black-American Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870–Present, supra note 33.
81. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 604 (M.D.N.C. 2016). The federal district court
ruled on the challenge only after a state court rejected an identical challenge. Id. at 609.
82. Id. at 611.
83. Id. at 614.
84. Id. at 616–17.
85. Id. at 618.
86. Id. at 622–26.
87. Id. at 627.
88. Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-CV-949, 2016 WL 3129213, at *1 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016).
89. Id. at *2.
90. Id. at *2–*3. However, the district court left open the possibility of a future challenge to the
plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Id.
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congressional delegation favored Republicans by a 10-3 margin.91 And once again
the plan elected two African-American Democrats from Districts 1 and 12.92
The year after the 2016 election, the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s
finding of a racial gerrymander.93 The Court’s reasoning largely tracked that of the
district court. In relation to District 1, the Court noted that race predominated in
its creation because a racial target was set to make the district majority black and
that the district could not survive strict scrutiny because it was not required by
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.94 In relation to District 12, the Court rejected
North Carolina’s argument that politics rather than race predominated in its
creation.95 The State made no attempt to justify District 12 under strict scrutiny.96
C. Conclusion: Why Focus on North Carolina?
North Carolina’s congressional map has endured two separate cycles of racial
gerrymandering litigation over the past twenty-five years with five full-blown
opinions from the United States Supreme Court. Over that time, more than a dozen
Congressional elections have been held using various plans—some deemed to be
racial gerrymanders and some not. But what has that two-and-a-half decades worth
of litigation and elections under various plans resulted in? That’s the question to
which we will turn in Part II.
But before we assess the impact of racial gerrymandering doctrine, a quick
word on the reasons it is appropriate to focus on North Carolina’s congressional
map as the launching point for discussion of the impact of racial gerrymandering
doctrine. First, North Carolina’s congressional districts have seen more racial
gerrymandering litigation at the Supreme Court level than any other districts in the
country, therefore making the North Carolina congressional districts the most highprofile racial gerrymandering litigation to date. Second, North Carolina’s
congressional districts were where racial gerrymandering doctrine started and were
challenged in two separate redistricting cycles, thus allowing for discussion about the
doctrine’s impact over as long a time period as possible. Third, the racial
gerrymandering challenges to North Carolina’s congressional districts have a
bipartisan tinge to them because the challenge in the 1990s was to a Democratic
gerrymander while the challenge in the 2010s was to a Republican gerrymander.
Thus, North Carolina’s congressional districts allow for discussion of racial
gerrymandering doctrine in both types of political environments that racial
gerrymandering challenges have been successfully used. For these reasons, North
Carolina’s congressional districts seem like an appropriate focal point for discussion,
91. KAREN L. HAAS, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 8, 2016, at 58 (2017), http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/
2016election/ [https://perma.cc/XD3U-L39H].
92. Id.
93. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
94. Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1252, slip op. at 10–18 (S. Ct. May 22, 2017).
95. Id. at 18–34.
96. Id. at 34.
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although I will also occasionally intersperse examples from other litigation during
the discussion in Part II.97
II. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RACIAL GERRYMANDERING DOCTRINE
Racial gerrymandering doctrine has existed for twenty-five years. During that
time, numerous successful claims have been litigated in North Carolina and
elsewhere.98 And those successful claims have been against both congressional and
state redistricting plans.99
But what has been the overall impact of the doctrine? In creating the doctrine,
the Court, essentially, dangled the prospect of greater racial harmony (the details of
which will be discussed in a moment). Has racial gerrymandering doctrine achieved
the Court’s aims in this regard? Moreover, legal doctrines can also have other
implicit or unintended consequences. What other consequences has racial
gerrymandering doctrine had? This Part explores these questions.
A. The Court’s Explicit Doctrinal Goals
A fitting place to begin an assessment of racial gerrymandering doctrine’s
impact is with the Court’s stated goals when it created the doctrine.100 Racial
gerrymandering doctrine is somewhat unique in election law jurisprudence because
the initial decision creating the doctrine, Shaw v. Reno, contained an explicit
announcement of the doctrine’s goals. In contrast, when creating other election law
causes of action, such as one person, one vote and racial vote dilution, the Court
has been more opaque in delineating doctrinal aims.
The key statement of racial gerrymandering doctrine’s goals from Shaw is:
[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances
matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographic and political boundaries, and who may have little in common
with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. We have rejected such perceptions as impermissible racial
stereotypes . . . By perpetuating such notions a racial gerrymander may
exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority
districting is sometimes said to counteract.

97. I also recognize North Carolina’s congressional districts only represent a few data points in
assessing the doctrine as a whole, which is why I rely quite a bit on empirical research in Part II.
98. Supra note 6.
99. Supra note 6.
100. I use the term “goals” but recognize the Court never used that term. I think the word
“goals” is useful shorthand for what might be described as “the harms the Court was addressing.”
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The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally
pernicious. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the
perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more
likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the
members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is
altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy.101
While the above paragraphs represented the most elaborate exposition of
the doctrine’s goals, some of these same sentiments also appeared elsewhere in
Shaw. For instance, in a couple of other places the Court emphasized the
divisiveness that racial gerrymandering might create, noting that “[c]lassifications of
citizens solely on the basis of race . . . threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason
of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.”102 And the Court
also reiterated the impact of racial gerrymandering on elected officials, writing that
“[racial gerrymandering] reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine
our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they
represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole.”103
Thus, in the decision creating racial gerrymandering doctrine—Shaw v. Reno—
we have several explicit statements of doctrinal goals. The basic goals involve a
couple of aspects of representative democracy. The first involves the behavior of
voters. The second involves the behavior of elected officials. An important question
is whether racial gerrymandering doctrine has helped further either of these goals.
1. Voter Behavior
One theory behind racial gerrymandering doctrine was that an electoral district
created by racial gerrymandering will feature greater racially polarized voting than a
district not created by racial gerrymandering. In the Court’s view, the governmental
stereotyping that led to a racially gerrymandered district’s creation will “exacerbate”
racially polarized voting.104 And by outlawing racial gerrymanders, the Court creates
an electoral environment less conducive to polarized voting.105

101.
102.

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993).
Id. at 643. The Shaw opinion also notes:
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. They
reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should
be judged by the color of their skin. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry
particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into
competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system
in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based
districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 657.
103. Id. at 650.
104. Id. at 647–48.
105. As Justice O’Connor wrote in a concurring opinion in a racial gerrymandering decision
from 1996: “At the same time that we combat the symptoms of racial polarization in politics [with the
Voting Rights Act], we must strive to eliminate[, with racial gerrymandering doctrine,] unnecessary racebased state action that appears to endorse the disease.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 993 (1996).
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Whether racial gerrymandering doctrine causes lower levels of polarized
voting (or is even associated with lower levels of polarized voting) is something that
could be empirically tested but to my knowledge has not been.106 Over the years
there have been a number of districts that: (1) were created by the government; (2)
held an election; (3) were later struck down as racial gerrymanders by federal courts;
and (4) were replaced with districts that were not racially gerrymandered. For
instance, North Carolina’s District 12 was created by North Carolina in 1991. The
district was used for three elections. The district was struck down as a racial
gerrymander, redrawn, and then a new district was drawn in which an election was
held.107 Thus, researchers might design a study to determine whether racially
polarized voting was different in the racially gerrymandered district as opposed to
the “unracially” gerrymandered district. For instance, one might assess the behavior
of voters who were part of the racially gerrymandered district and who were also
part of the “unracially” gerrymandered district to determine if those voters changed
their behavior in some meaningful way. There may well be other, better research
designs—my point is that seemingly one could design some sort of assessment of
the impact of racial gerrymandering doctrine on polarized voting.108
Perhaps someday researchers will directly study whether racial gerrymandering
doctrine leads to reduced polarization among voters, but, for several reasons, it
seems unlikely racially polarized voting changes much from one election to the next
depending on whether a district is drawn with or without race as the predominant
factor. First, the Shaw Court’s own theorizing on the subject is hesitant—racially
gerrymandered districts “may exacerbate” patterns of racially polarized voting (my
emphasis).109 Put simply, even in creating the doctrine, the Court hedged its bets.
Second, in post-Shaw discussions of the purpose of racial gerrymandering doctrine,
the Court moved away from the idea that the doctrine will reduce polarized
voting.110 So, not only did the Court initially hedge its bets, it subsequently seems
to have folded its cards. Third, empirical research suggests the type of district in
which a voter resides does not have an impact on racial attitudes (i.e., belief in racial

106. Supra note 12.
107. Supra Part I.A.
108. A couple of general caveats about additional empirical research related to the impact of
racial gerrymandering doctrine. First, in some instances it may not be feasible to conduct any useful
empirical inquiry. Put differently, it may not be possible to gather any useful empirical data about some
aspects of how racial gerrymandering doctrine operates. Second, I recognize that even useful empirical
data may not conclusively resolve certain points. For instance, it may be impossible to design a study
to conclusively determine that racial gerrymandering doctrine causes something because electoral
environments can shift from year to year. Putting both points simply, empirical research may be difficult
to generate, and even if it can be generated, it may not conclusively resolve debate over the impact of
racial gerrymandering doctrine.
109. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
110. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017) (discussing the
rationale for the doctrine and not discussing racially polarized voting); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus
v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015) (same).
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stereotypes).111 And if the type of district does not impact racial attitudes, it seems
likely the type of district also will not change the level of racially polarized voting.
Fourth, there is little reason to think that a doctrine preventing race from being the
“predominant” motive of those engaged in redistricting will impact the behavior of
voters at an election.112 Put differently, why would the motive of the district’s
designers impact the motives of the district’s voters?
Of course, what I’ve posited so far relates mostly to measuring changes in
voter polarization over the short haul (e.g., comparing one election to the very next
election), but racial gerrymandering doctrine’s performance in this realm could be
more long term. In other words, the creation and use of racial gerrymandering
doctrine does not change voters’ hearts and minds overnight but rather will change
hearts and minds over several decades. On this score, it would be interesting to
conduct a study that measures polarization over time. For instance, perhaps North
Carolina is a less racially polarized place today than it was twenty-five years ago, and
perhaps racial gerrymandering doctrine in some meaningful way has contributed to
that trend.
Again, though, it seems unlikely racial gerrymandering doctrine has been much
of a success in this regard. In North Carolina’s congressional delegation, there were
two African-American candidates elected under the racially gerrymandered plans
and two African-American candidates are still being elected a quarter-century
later.113 So there’s no greater integration in the State’s congressional delegation over
time, indicating that African-American candidates still struggle to generate
substantial crossover voting from whites in districts not specifically designed to
allow African-American voters to elect their candidates of choice. Yet perhaps these
African-American candidates (and all the other white candidates) are being elected
111. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 12, at 1043 (“We conclude that residents of [majorityminority districts] are indistinguishable from residents of other districts in their answers to questions
attempting to measure belief in racial stereotypes.”).
112. Thanks to Chris Elmendorf for this point. Of course, racial composition of a district may
influence the candidates who run and how those candidates campaign (e.g., a campaign that involves
more polarized messaging). However, racial gerrymandering doctrine does not block creation of
districts with certain racial compositions. Instead, racial gerrymandering doctrine only blocks some
districts drawn with a particular motive. Put more concretely, a hypothetical 55% minority district might
be struck down if race was the predominant factor and it did not survive strict scrutiny. But another
55% minority district might be upheld because race was used but did not predominate or because race
predominated but the district survived strict scrutiny. Yet the racial environment for polarized voting
would seemingly be no different in either district. Of course, if racial gerrymandering doctrine only
applied to districts that gathered black and white voters with fewer non-racial commonalities then it
might make sense to say that racial gerrymandering doctrine could reduce polarized voting because,
presumably, voters with greater non-racial commonalities will be less polarized. But the problem of
racial gerrymandering identified by the Court in the racial gerrymandering cases is not that the districts
combine minority and non-minority voters who have fewer commonalities. Rather, the problem
identified by the Court seems to be that minority voters who have few commonalities have been linked
together. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 908 (1995) (describing how Georgia’s Eleventh
District linked “metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black populace of coastal Chatham County, though
260 miles apart in distance and worlds apart in culture”).
113. Supra Part I.A.
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in a somewhat less racially polarized environment. However, it’s hard to see that
much racial progress has been made in North Carolina politics over the last twentyfive years. On this score, recall that a federal appellate court noted that North
Carolina enacted voting-related legislation in 2013 that targeted black voters “with
almost surgical precision.”114
Looking at a more macro level than North Carolina, racial polarization does
not appear to have changed much over time and may have become worse since the
arrival of racial gerrymandering doctrine. As the University of Chicago’s Nick
Stephanopoulos notes:
In both [the South and the non-South], black-white polarization was severe
in 1972, dipped in 1976 and 1980, declined more consistently from 1985
to 1996, and then rose steadily from 1996 to 2012. But too much should
not be made of these shifts. The overall picture is one of stability . . . . In
fact, black and white voters were about as divided in the period’s final
election as in its first.115
To be fair, though, these reflect national trends and perhaps areas where racial
gerrymandering doctrine has actually been used are different. And, of course, even
if racially polarized voting has become worse since the creation of racial
gerrymandering doctrine, it’s always possible that racial gerrymandering doctrine
kept polarized voting from becoming even worse.
In short, there does not appear to be any evidence the doctrine has reduced
racially polarized voting. That said, it’s possible additional study could change that
conclusion.
2. Elected Official Behavior
The second basic thread running through the Court’s theoretical underpinning
for racial gerrymandering doctrine relates to elected representatives rather than
voters. The idea is that candidates elected from racially gerrymandered districts will
be more likely to represent members of one racial group rather than the district as
a whole. Put into a more concrete hypothetical, in a district racially gerrymandered
to be, say, majority black, the elected representative will cater to black constituents
rather than the entire constituency.116
To the best of my knowledge, no one has directly studied whether racial
gerrymandering doctrine changes elected official behavior even though it seems
114. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
115. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1357 (2016);
see also Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region and Voter Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for
the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1405 (2010).
116. Presumably this can work in the opposite direction as well. A district racially
gerrymandered to be majority white will have an elected representative who will represent white
constituents rather than the entire constituency. I use a majority-black district as the example in the
main text because Shaw involved a majority-black district and because racial gerrymandering challenges
so far have typically involved districts that provide African-American voters the ability to elect
candidates of choice.
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plausible to do so. Districts redrawn after successful racial gerrymandering
challenges sometimes retain the exact same representative. For instance, in the
1990s, the same representative was elected in North Carolina District 12 both
before and after a successful racial gerrymandering claim.117 Presumably, a
researcher could design a study to assess whether campaign behavior changed,
legislative voting behavior changed, or constituent services changed after a
successful racial gerrymandering claim,118 and, if so, whether the successful racial
gerrymandering claim impacted that changed behavior.119 There are undoubtedly
other possible research designs—my point is that seemingly one could design a
study to measure whether racial gerrymandering doctrine achieves this goal.
But it seems doubtful that a successful racial gerrymandering claim causes any
meaningful change in elected official behavior. For starters, the Court’s own
musings in Shaw about representative behavior fails to capture how racial
gerrymandering doctrine works. In its discussion in Shaw, the Court talks about
districts drawn “solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial
group.”120 But the doctrine itself addresses only a district where race was a
predominant factor in its creation.121 So the doctrine still allows race to be a factor.
For example, even after the successful racial gerrymandering challenge to North
Carolina’s District 12 in the 1990s, race remained a factor in crafting the remedial
plan.122 If race remains a factor in the drawing of a district, it seems likely incentives
will still exist for elected officials to represent members of a particular racial group
117. Supra notes 40, 57 and accompanying text.
118. One commentator has argued that inadequate constituent service could provide a
justification for racial gerrymandering doctrine. Joshua Bone, Stop Ignoring Parks and Potholes: Election
Law and Constituent Service, 123 YALE L.J. 1407, 1445–47 (2014). But the author seems to use as a
premise that one non-compact ability-to-elect district can be traded off for a more compact ability-toelect district. Id. at 1446. However, it may be that one non-compact ability-to-elect district leads to a
compact district that no longer gives minority voters the ability to elect a candidate of choice. More
fundamentally, it’s quite possible racial bias exists in the provision of constituent services. Daniel
M. Butler & David E. Brockman, Do Politicians Really Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field
Experiment on State Legislatures, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 463, 464 (2011) (“White legislators of both parties
discriminate against the black alias at nearly identical, statistically significant rates, while minority
legislators do the opposite, responding more frequently to the black alias.”). Thus, if legislators provide
better constituent services to persons of their own race, it’s possible that homogenous districts that are
racially gerrymandered to be more homogenous provide better constituent services than heterogeneous
districts—to both black and white constituents alike.
119. Again, such research may not be easy to conduct and may not provide absolutely definitive
results. Supra note 108. As one researcher wrote:
[S]tudies of redistricting are complicated by numerous threats to validity. In virtually all
redistricting studies, changes in district boundaries are accompanied by a host of other
changes in the legislative environment, including shifts to chamber membership, committee
rosters, partisan control of the legislature, and the chamber’s policy agenda. It is thus difficult
to isolate the effect of changes in the electoral environment on legislative voting behavior.
James Lo, Legislative Responsiveness to Gerrymandering: Evidence from the 2003 Texas Redistricting, 8
Q.J. POL. SCI. 75, 76 (2013).
120. Supra note 101 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
121. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
122. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 253–54 (2001) (recognizing that North Carolina
considered race in the redrawing of District 12).
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rather than the constituency as a whole. Moreover, to echo a point made earlier
during the discussion of polarized voting, it’s hard to see a solid link between the
motives of the redistricters and the behavior of candidates and representatives.123
Another factor that likely mitigates any impact of racial gerrymandering
doctrine on elected official behavior is that even after a successful racial
gerrymandering challenge, some (perhaps most) of the same elected officials will be
returned to office. For instance, in the 1990s Congressman Mel Watt was elected in
the racially gerrymandered District 12 and then again in the “unracially
gerrymandered” District 12. Did Congressman’s Watt’s behavior change in some
way because of the new district lines? Or did, say, Congressman Howard Coble, a
white Republican elected from a district adjacent to the Twelfth District, change his
behavior? Again, the suspicion is that elected representatives do not change their
behavior because of a successful racial gerrymandering challenge and this would
align with political science research suggesting members of Congress do not change
positions based on changes to their district boundaries.124
And yet another factor that likely minimizes the impact of racial
gerrymandering doctrine on elected official behavior is that a successful racial
gerrymandering challenge typically makes a district more racially heterogeneous. For
instance, after the successful racial gerrymandering challenge to the post-2010
congressional redistricting plan in North Carolina, District 12 went from being
50.7% black voting-age population (BVAP) to 36.2% BVAP.125 Some research
suggests that greater diversity in a district does not lead to more “moderate”
behavior on the part of an elected representative.126 In other words, a more racially
123. Supra note 112 and accompanying text.
124. Lo, supra note 119 (finding that passage of a new redistricting plan in Texas did not
moderate the voting records of targeted incumbents); see also Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds?
Not in Congress!, 131 PUB. CHOICE 435, 447 (2007) (“The weight of the evidence . . . suggests that
members of Congress are very stable ideologically.”). But see Anthony M. Bertelli & Jamie L. Carson,
Small Changes, Big Results: Legislative Voting Behavior in the Presence of New Voters, 30 ELECTORAL
STUD. 201, 205 (2011) (study of the 2000 redistricting cycle suggesting “[p]ermanent changes in
constituencies implemented via redistricting made average congressional vote patterns more
conservative. On the other hand, individual legislators who survived the first election in their new
districts changed their voting patterns only slightly while in our preferred specification, they moved, on
average, in a liberal direction.”); Jamie L. Carson et al., Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S.
House of Representatives, 35 AM. POL. RES. 878, 899–900 (2007) (suggesting that “a portion of the
polarization we are observing in Congress is being artificially generated by the mapmakers responsible
for drawing district boundaries” and refusing to rule out the possibility that redistricting contributes to
polarization).
125. Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1262, slip op. at 21 (S. Ct. May 22, 2017) (2010 plan data);
N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, VOTING AGE POPULATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY - DISTRICT 12 (2016),
http://www.ncleg.net/GIS/Download/District_Plans/DB_2016/Congress/2016_Contingent_
Congressional_Plan_-_Corrected/Reports/VTD_SingleDistrict/Vap_PDF/rptVTDVap-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7G9-LKFR] (2016 plan data).
126. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District
Heterogeneity, and Political Representation, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1364, 1378 (2004) (“[L]egislators take
policy positions that are close to their district’s median when many constituents share these preferences.
In heterogeneous districts, median preference is a much less powerful predictor of legislative behavior.
Legislators from heterogeneous districts often take policy positions that diverge substantially from the
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competitive district might cause an elected official to cater more to the racial “base”
of the district than to play to the center.127
In sum, there is little evidence racial gerrymandering doctrine changes elected
official behavior. Of course, more study could reveal that racial gerrymandering
doctrine changes elected official behavior and changes it for what the Court views
as something better—representing the “constituency as a whole” rather than just
“the common interests of one racial group.”128 At this point, though, such evidence
does not exist.129
3. Of Stigmas and Stereotypes
In my view, the Court identified only two clear, real-world goals for racial
gerrymandering doctrine—reducing polarized voting and making elected officials
more responsive to their entire constituencies. But I acknowledge that another
thread running through the Court’s justification for racial gerrymandering doctrine
involves what might be called a stigmatic harm.130 The idea seems to be that when
the government engages in racial gerrymandering, an individual gets stereotyped and
this stereotyping is harmful in some way different from racially polarized voting or
racially-biased representation from an elected official.131 Indeed, this individual
harm has come to be emphasized even more over the twenty-five-year existence of
the doctrine. As Justice Kennedy wrote in a 2017 racial gerrymandering decision,
“The harms that flow from racial sorting include being personally subjected to a racial
classification as well as being represented by a legislator who believes his primary
obligation is to represent only members of a particular racial group.”132 And this
median voter in their district.”); see also Devin Caughey et al., Partisan Gerrymandering and the Political
Process: Effects on Roll-Call Voting and State Policies, 16 ELECTION L.J. 453, 457 (2017) (noting that
“narrowly elected legislators take similar positions to those elected by 10 percentage points or more”).
127. A district that is more racially competitive may be one that is more integrated. Interestingly,
some research suggests that greater black-white residential integration results in greater polarization.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at 1359 (“[A]s blacks become more residentially integrated, they grow
somewhat more electorally polarized from whites.”). Of course, just because a single-member district
becomes more integrated does not mean underlying residential segregation has been reduced. The
“integrated” single-member district may just represent a combination of highly residentially segregated
areas.
128. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
129. Of course, as with polarized voting, it’s possible racial gerrymandering doctrine has little
or no short-term impact on elected officials but instead has a long-term impact. For instance,
Rep. Alma Adams was elected from racially gerrymandered North Carolina District 12 in 2014 and
unracially gerrymandered District 12 in 2016. Perhaps Rep. Adams will not change due to the new
district but perhaps a successor representative will. My instinct would be that unless Rep. Adams
changed in some way it’s unlikely her successor would change in some way because of racial
gerrymandering doctrine, rather than, say, the overarching political dynamic. But, to my knowledge, no
one has studied this. I also suspect this would be very difficult to empirically assess.
130. See Melissa L. Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109
YALE L.J. 1603, 1620 (2000); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text (language from Shaw).
131. See supra note 101; see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (discussing the
“foster[ing of] harmful and divisive stereotypes”).
132. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017) (emphasis added).
Despite the Court’s individual rights rhetoric, I suspect that the Court is really trying to address some
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view of being personally subjected to a racial classification was also part of Justice
Breyer’s opinion for the Court in a 2015 racial gerrymandering decision.133
But, to put the point kindly, the precise nature of the personal harm is, as one
commentator noted, “somewhat elusive.”134 Quite honestly, I am unsure exactly
what the Court seeks to accomplish in addressing the personal harm.135 And I am
not alone.136 The Court discusses stereotyping without identifying what the
stereotype actually is.137 And the Court talks of stereotyping in a case, Shaw, where
a majority-black district was drawn and white plaintiffs were allowed to challenge it.
One would think that the stereotype would be the idea that all black voters think
alike but, if that was the case, wouldn’t you require a black voter to be a plaintiff? Is
any voter—white, black, or otherwise—wearing a scarlet letter of stigma due to the
district they have been placed in? And the way racial gerrymandering doctrine has
developed, the State can still use race which, presumably, involves stereotyping on
some level. So it is okay to stereotype, just not too much? Frankly, I think the Court
uses the rhetoric of stereotyping (and individual rights) in part to hide the fact that
the doctrine likely does not accomplish the Court’s initially stated goals.
But assuming racial gerrymandering doctrine is intended to promote less
stereotyping of individuals, one could try to measure doctrinal success in at least a
few different ways. One could try to measure whether people who lived in racially
gerrymandered districts engage in more stereotyping than those who do not. One
could try to measure whether officials elected in racially gerrymandered districts
engaged in more racial stereotyping than officials elected in the remedial, unracially

sort of societal harm. See Sue T. Kilgore, Between the Devil and Deep Blue Sea: Courts, Legislatures, and
Majority-Minority Districts, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1299, 1320 (1997) (describing the harm of racial
gerrymandering as “harm to society as a whole caused by reinforcing racial stereotypes”). But the exact
nature of the societal harm and how the Court’s doctrine tangibly reduces that harm are unclear.
133. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015) (citations omitted)
(“[T]he harms that underlie a racial gerrymandering claim . . . are personal. They include being
‘personally . . . subjected to [a] racial classification,’ as well as being represented by a legislator who
believes his ‘primary obligation is to represent only the members’ of a particular racial group” (citations
omitted).).
134. Saunders, supra note 130, at 1620; see also Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 49, at 242
(noting that “the Court has yet to clarify how an individual is harmed when district boundaries are
predominantly influenced by racial considerations” and that “the Court does not say what exactly this
[individual] right is”); Hasen, supra note 26, at 382 (“[T]he cause of action for racial gerrymandering
protects against no real harm. . . . [T]here is no good evidence that racially conscious districts, including
majority-minority districts, actually send messages to voters about the separation of voters by race. The
harm of such racial gerrymandering is less than ‘ephemeral’; it is non-existent” (footnotes omitted).).
135. Tania Tetlow, How Batson Spawned Shaw – Requiring the Government to Treat Citizens as
Individuals when It Cannot, 49 LOY. L. REV. 133, 158 (2003) (“[ T ]he harm resulting from these
stereotyping decisions is nebulous at best. . . . [V]oters suffer no consequences as individuals from
redistricting decisions.”).
136. See Hasen, supra note 26, at 365 (describing racial gerrymandering as “a shaky, ephemeral
claim based solely on appearances”).
137. Saunders, supra note 130, at 1620 (“As Shaw’s critics have often pointed out, it is impossible
to say with a straight face that plaintiffs in Shaw and its progeny—all of whom resided in districts that
were quite racially integrated—were being stigmatized in that particular way.”).
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gerrymandered districts.138 One could try to measure whether a legislature that drew
a racially gerrymandered set of districts had different racial attitudes than a later set
of legislators who were compelled to draw a plan that was not racially
gerrymandered. One could try to measure whether the individuals who lived in the
racially gerrymandered districts felt less stereotyped after being moved to an
unracially gerrymandered district. And there undoubtedly are even more ways to
measure racial gerrymandering doctrine’s impact on stereotyping.
But even assuming we take the stereotyping rationale seriously, it is unlikely
the doctrine has led to any sort of systematic impact on stereotyping. One of the
few articles that directly assesses racial gerrymandering doctrine’s impact concludes
that the doctrine does little on this score. As Professors Steve Ansolabehere and
Nate Persily conclude, “contrary to the assumptions that undergird the Shaw cause
of action, the data do not suggest variation among racial groups [in belief of
stereotypes] depending on the type of district in which they live.”139 So it seems that
the type of district in which a person resides does not impact racial attitudes.
But perhaps legislators elected from an unracially gerrymandered plan would
engage in less stereotyping. Yet there often does not seem to be much of a change
in who gets elected between a racially gerrymandered plan and a later remedial plan.
For example, after North Carolina’s 2011 plan was declared a racial gerrymander
and a new unracially gerrymandered plan was used, North Carolina had twelve of
thirteen incumbents re-elected. And even when an incumbent was not re-elected, a
Republican just replaced a Republican.140 It’s possible the incumbents adopted less
stereotypical ideas as a result of the doctrine, but it seems unlikely that new district
lines would spark such a conversion.141
Perhaps the legislators doing the redistricting would stereotype less following
a finding of racial gerrymandering, but, again, that seems unlikely. Republicans drew
the plan for North Carolina’s congressional districts in 2011. They then drew the
plan in 2016. Did the second legislature have any less stereotypical beliefs that were
caused by racial gerrymandering doctrine’s existence? And, lest one think I am
picking on Republicans—the same thing happened in the 1990s. Democrats drew
a racially gerrymandered plan and then drew the remedial plan. Did these
Democrats have any less stereotypical views the second time around because the
Court held their first plan to be a racial gerrymander?
Finally, maybe the people who lived in the districts in 2011 and challenged
them as a successful racial gerrymander felt less stereotyped by the new districts.
Although it might be difficult, perhaps someone could survey residents of a district
138. In some ways, this could be similar to the goal of having elected officials represent their
constituency as a whole. It’s possible a representative who engaged in less stereotyping will be more
likely to represent the constituency as a whole rather than just a racial or ethnic subsection of the district.
139. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 12, at 1043.
140. Rep. George Holding replaced Rep. Renee Ellmers in District 2. Rep. Ted Budd replaced
Rep. George Holding in District 13. HAAS, supra note 92, at 58. In other words, Rep. Holding was reelected—just from a different district—and Rep. Ellmers essentially was replaced by Rep. Budd.
141. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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challenged as a racial gerrymander and then conduct a second survey after a
successful challenge and a remedial district was drawn. We could then determine
whether individuals felt less stereotyped because of racial gerrymandering doctrine
changing the district lines. My suspicion is that racial gerrymandering doctrine has
little overall impact because citizens tend to not be very knowledgeable about
election laws,142 but one cannot say for certain.
It bears repeating, though, that this is an awfully difficult area to assess the
doctrine’s impact because of the vagueness in the Court’s delineation of the harm.
When the Court talks about stigmas and stereotypes, it does not give much
indication as to who exactly is being stereotyped or stigmatized, what the exact
stereotype or stigma is, and exactly how racial gerrymandering doctrine improves
the situation in some tangible way.143 Of course, that may be the point for the
Justices. If they do not articulate a clear, measurable agenda then no one can hold
them accountable for failure to achieve the agenda.
B. Representational Impacts on Minority Voters
The Court’s creation of racial gerrymandering doctrine focused on two clear,
explicit goals. The Court wanted the doctrine to foster less racially polarized voting
and also wanted the doctrine to create an environment where elected officials would
represent their entire constituency rather than a racial or ethnic subgroup. There
was also a vague dash of anti-stereotyping thrown in.
But explicit goals might not be the whole story of the doctrine’s impact.
Perhaps there were other sub silentio consequences members of the Shaw majority
wished to accomplish. Or, quite likely, the doctrine could result in other completely
unintended consequences.
While the creation of racial gerrymandering doctrine was not explicitly about
the amount or quality of representation provided to a minority group,144 racial
gerrymandering doctrine nonetheless may have impacted minority voters’
representation. Put differently, even if the Court was not intending to either reduce
or enhance minority voters’ representation, racial gerrymandering doctrine might
have led to the reduction or enhancement of minority voters’ representation.
142. Knowledge About Voter Laws Still Lacking, CTR. FOR INFO. & RES. ON CIVIC LEARNING
& ENGAGEMENT (Oct. 30, 2012), http://civicyouth.org/knowledge-about-voter-laws-still-lacking/
[https://perma.cc/9V7L-HDRA].
143. As Rick Pildes & Richard Niemi wrote soon after the doctrine’s creation:
One can only understand Shaw, we believe, in terms of a view that what we call expressive
harms are constitutionally cognizable. An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas
or attitudes expressed through a governmental action rather than from the more tangible or
material consequences the action brings about. . . . Public policies can violate the
Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning
they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values.
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993).
144. I concede that the goal of elected officials playing to their whole constituency rather than
a racial subgroup could have an impact on representation for a minority group. In this portion of the
Article, I am offering a different angle on the representational impact on minority voters.
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Two well-recognized types of representation exist in relation to minority
voters—descriptive representation and substantive representation.145 Descriptive
representation is the easiest to measure. The question asked in relation to descriptive
representation is whether the elected representative shares the same racial or ethnic
group as the voters who control the outcome in the district. To put this into a
concrete example, descriptive representation occurs when a district controlled by
black voters elects a black candidate. In contrast, the question asked in relation to
substantive representation is whether the representative shares the same substantive
agenda or policy preferences of the racial or ethnic group.146 The next two subparts
discuss racial gerrymandering doctrine’s impact on these two types of
representation.
1. Descriptive Representation
An initial concern about the creation of racial gerrymandering doctrine was
that the doctrine would lead to less descriptive representation for minority voters.
For instance, Stanford’s Pam Karlan worried the doctrine would cause the first
decrease in black representation since Reconstruction.147 This made sense because
virtually all the districts challenged as racial gerrymanders, such as North Carolina’s
District 12, had been drawn to increase minority descriptive representation.148
But it’s not clear racially gerrymandering doctrine has decreased descriptive
representation.149 For instance, take the litigation involving North Carolina’s
congressional districts over the years. The redistricting plan initially challenged in
145. See generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); see
also Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 557 n.9 (2011) (“In Hanna Pitkin’s classic formulation, ‘descriptive’ representation
is concerned with representing the identity of a voter, while ‘substantive’ representation is concerned
with representing the interests of a voter.”).
146. Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black
Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 794 (1996) (“[I]f minority voters generally elect
minority candidates [in majority-minority districts] to represent them, then descriptive representation—
increasing the number of minority officeholders—goes hand in hand with substantive representation—
enacting legislation that furthers the interests of the minority community.”); see also David Epstein &
Sharyn O’Halloran, Measuring the Electoral and Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts, 43
AM. J. POL. SCI., 367, 385 (1999) (defining descriptive representation as “electing minorities to office”
and substantive representation as “passing minority-favored legislation”).
147. Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50
VAND. L. REV. 291, 292 (1997); see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of
Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1603 (1994) (“[T]he
[Shaw] Court has made it possible that North Carolina’s (and other states’ as well) congressional
representation might once again become lily white by providing the basis for invalidating all minoritymajority districts.”).
148. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961 (1996) (noting that three districts successfully
challenged as racial gerrymanders “were created for the purpose of enhancing the opportunity of
minority voters to elect minority representatives to Congress” (citation omitted)); see also supra notes 3–
25 and accompanying text.
149. As Nick Stephanopoulos wrote after reviewing the literature, the “concern [about a
decrease in descriptive representation] does not seem to be validated by the existing data, but this data
is so patchy it’s impossible to tell.” Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at 1364.
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the early 1990s contained two majority-black districts (Districts 1 and 12), both of
which elected an African-American candidate.150 After District 12 was successfully
challenged as a racial gerrymander and the North Carolina map was redrawn, the
same two incumbent African-American candidates were returned to office from the
same two districts.151 The same two districts continued to elect African-American
candidates after the post-2000 redistricting plan.152 After the 2010 round of
redistricting, the two districts electing African-American candidates were
successfully challenged as racial gerrymanders and redrawn.153 And, after the
districts were redrawn, those same two African-American candidates were reelected.154 So when it comes to North Carolina’s congressional districts, two AfricanAmerican candidates were elected prior to the creation of racial gerrymandering doctrine and
two successful racial gerrymandering challenges over the course of twenty-five years have done
nothing to change the amount of descriptive representation in Congress for African-American
citizens of North Carolina.
And the dynamics of descriptive representation in other States may not be all
that different—at least when it comes to congressional districts. For instance, prior
to the successful racial gerrymandering challenge in Georgia during the 1990s, there
were three African-Americans elected to Congress.155 After the challenges? Three
African-Americans were elected to Congress.156 Same thing in Virginia. Virginia was
found to have racially gerrymandered Congressional District 3, which had elected
Rep. Bobby Scott, an African American.157 After District 3 was redrawn, it
continued to elect Rep. Scott.158
But it seems likely that at least in some instances racial gerrymandering
doctrine has led to a bit less descriptive representation for minority voters at least
at some points in time. This can undoubtedly be measured directly in some
instances. For example, after a successful racial gerrymandering challenge in
Louisiana during the 1990s, the number of African-American members of Congress

150. District 1 elected Rep. Eva Clayton and District 12 elected Rep. Mel Watt. See supra notes
3–33.
151. See supra note 57.
152. District 1 was represented briefly by Rep. Frank Ballance and then Rep. G.K. Butterfield;
District 12 was represented by Rep. Alma Adams. Supra note 73.
153. See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
154. Supra note 91.
155. District 2 elected Rep. Sanford Bishop, District 5 elected Rep. John Lewis, and District 11
elected Rep. Cynthia McKinney. DALLAS L. DENDY, JR., STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 3, 1992, at 18–19 (1993), http://history.house.gov/
Institution/Election-Statistics/1992election/ [https://perma.cc/8GJN-JLCH].
156. The same three candidates were elected from redrawn districts in 1996, although
Rep. McKinney was elected from District 4 rather than District 11. ROBIN H. CARLE, STATISTICS
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 5, 1996, at 18 ( 1997),
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/1996election/ [https://perma.cc/UMW7D2RF].
157. Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1997).
158. Biography, CONGRESSMAN BOBBY SCOTT, https://bobbyscott.house.gov/about/
biography [https://perma.cc/UUS8-9GKE] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
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from that state went from two to one.159 And, during the 1990s, a number of
successful challenges to state legislative districting plans occurred, likely resulting in
the loss of some descriptive representation on the state legislative level.160
Moreover, one would guess that the specter of a racial gerrymandering challenge
causes redistricting actors to be slightly more hesitant to create additional majorityminority districts that would provide descriptive representation for fear of inviting
a racial gerrymandering challenge. Finally, because racial gerrymandering concerns
creep into concerns about geographic compactness for purposes of Section 2 vote
dilution lawsuits,161 racial gerrymandering doctrine may have led to fewer Section 2
challenges being successfully brought.
However, a fairly recent study suggests racial gerrymandering doctrine did not
reduce descriptive representation for minority voters in state legislatures. Professor
Nick Stephanopoulos has presented data using state legislatures which
demonstrates “minority representation has increased considerably in the modern
era with much of the progress taking place in the 1990s.”162 From his perspective,
then, the data “provide no support for the claim that the Court’s racial
gerrymandering decisions may have reduced minority representation.”163
But it’s possible this research does not fully capture the impact of racial
gerrymandering doctrine on descriptive representation for several reasons. First, the
focus of the research was on the impact of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act rather
than racial gerrymandering doctrine, with the research making only very passing
mention of racial gerrymandering doctrine. Second, the research studied state
legislatures, leaving aside Congress and local governments.164 Third, it appears the
study defines a reduction of minority representation as a decrease in the number of
minority legislators.165 However, it’s possible that increases in the number of
minority legislators would have been even greater in a world without racial
gerrymandering doctrine. Indeed, the research shows that the largest increase in
descriptive representation occurred during the 1990 redistricting cycle and that
increases have been lower in subsequent cycles.166 Such a pattern is consistent with
the idea that racial gerrymandering doctrine limited increases in descriptive

159. District 2 elected Rep. William Jefferson and District 4 elected Rep. Cleo Fields. DENDY,
JR., supra note 155. After the redrawing of Rep. Fields’ district, he opted to retire from
Congress. Biography: Cleo Fields, CONG. BLACK CAUCUS INST.: POL. EDUC. & LEADERSHIP,
https://cbcinstitute.org/team/cleo-fields [https://perma.cc/F874-96L6] (last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
160. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 929 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (successful racial
gerrymandering challenge to Georgia’s State House and Senate districts).
161. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977–79 (1996) (discussing Section 2 compactness in relation
to racial gerrymandering); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 427–35
(2006) (rejecting Texas’ argument that it complied with Section 2 because the district was “noncompact”
with numerous citations to racial gerrymandering decisions in the discussion).
162. Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at 1367.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1329.
165. Id. at 1367–68.
166. Id. at 1369–70.
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representation because racial gerrymandering doctrine only came to full fruition
during the latter stages of the 1990 cycle.
At the end of the day, this area seems ripe for more systematic empirical
analysis. At the very least, it would seem plausible to assess descriptive
representation both before and after all the successful racial gerrymandering
challenges to at least determine the short-term impact of the success of such
challenges on descriptive representation. Obviously, such a very basic study seems
likely to undercount the impact of racial gerrymandering doctrine because we may
never know how many additional ability-to-elect districts might have been
constructed in a world where racial gerrymandering challenges did not exist.167
Moreover, such a study may not account for later changes that mitigate any shortterm loss. Finally, any study may not be able to account for the impact of
incumbency on re-election. Put differently, African-American legislators may only
have been re-elected after a successful racial gerrymandering claim because they
were incumbents. However, such a study would give some indication of racial
gerrymandering doctrine’s impact on descriptive representation.168 While more
study would be welcome, at this point the available evidence is that racial
gerrymandering doctrine, at most, has led to slightly less descriptive representation
than would occur in the absence of the doctrine.
2. Substantive Representation
While it may not be possible to conclusively and comprehensively measure
racial gerrymandering doctrine’s impact on descriptive representation because it’s
difficult to know how many more ability to elect districts might have been drawn
absent creation of the doctrine, descriptive representation remains relatively easy to
quantify. One need only count the number of minority representatives elected from
districts controlled by minority voters.169 Substantive representation—the election
of representatives who represent the policy preferences of minority voters and then
turn those policy preferences into actual policy—is much more difficult to quantify.
How can we know whether minority voters are doing better or worse in terms of
legislative outcomes as a result of racial gerrymandering doctrine?
Political affiliation presents a potential proxy for substantive representation.
For instance, African-American voters overwhelmingly support Democratic
candidates. Thus, the election of additional Democrats can mean substantive

167. Of course, there may be other less obvious impacts of racial gerrymandering challenges,
such as settlement agreements or decisions to redraw districts prior to a final judgment.
168. I recognize it will be difficult, if not impossible, to fully account for districts not drawn
because of the specter of a racial gerrymandering challenge.
169. Admittedly, there may be a few instances where it’s unclear whether minority voters
control the outcome of a district. However, in most instances control (or lack thereof) is obvious.
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representation has improved for minority voters while the election of fewer
Democrats can be interpreted as a sign of diminished substantive representation.170
Using North Carolina’s congressional districts as an example, it seems like
racial gerrymandering claims have had little impact on substantive representation
for black voters—at least as measured by overall partisan outcomes. During the
1990s round of racial gerrymandering litigation, the last election held using the plan
declared to be a racial gerrymander was the 1996 contest which resulted in
Democrats winning in 6 of the 12 congressional districts.171 The 1998 election used
a plan developed by the State to remedy the racial gerrymander and the result of
that election was Democrats winning in five of the twelve districts.172 In the second
wave of racial gerrymandering litigation, Democrats held three of thirteen seats after
the last election (2014) using the plan that was held to be a racial gerrymander.173
After the next election, using a redrawn map, Democrats continued to hold three
of the thirteen seats.174 Put simply, after two successful racial gerrymandering
challenges in North Carolina, Republicans gained one seat overall (out of twentyfive possible seats—twelve elections in the 1990s and thirteen elections in the
2010s).175 This experience suggests racial gerrymandering doctrine does little to
change substantive representation and could even decrease it.
Again, though, problems exist with assessing whether racial gerrymandering
doctrine causes differences in substantive representation. Using the election of
Democrats as a proxy has flaws because it’s difficult to know whether a switch in a
seat from one party to another is the result of a different redistricting plan or of
other factors apart from the plan (e.g., a more or less favorable political environment
for Democrats generally). In addition, the type of Democrat or Republican elected
might change—even if the political party remains the same. For instance, a nonracially gerrymandered plan might elect more conservative Democrats or more
liberal Republicans.176 Finally, the 2010 round of racial gerrymandering litigation
featured an attempt by Democrats to “unpack” black voters so that those voters
could help elect white Democrats. This goal of Democrats was not immediately
achieved but perhaps over the long-haul Democrats will be aided by such litigation.
Another way of thinking about the impact of racial gerrymandering claims on
substantive representation might be to consider linkage between descriptive and
substantive representation. One interesting study assessed whether more descriptive
170. Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at 1382 (noting that one of the two main methods for
measuring substantive representation for minority voters is “share of legislative seats held by
Democrats”).
171. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
175. This leaves aside the fact that it’s a change of one seat out of 435 total seats in the House
of Representatives.
176. Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at 1382 (noting that one of the two most common metrics
for assessing substantive representation is “the liberalism of the median legislator, determined on the
basis of roll call votes”).
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representation for minority voters leads to less substantive representation.177 The
study analyzed the impact of the 1992 South Carolina Senate redistricting plan—a
plan expressly designed to increase black descriptive representation—on senator
voting.178 The authors concluded that “black substantive representation fell after
the 1992 redistricting” and “resulted in a more polarized Senate, less friendly overall
to minority policy concerns.”179 If this is the case, and if racial gerrymandering
doctrine had led to a small decrease in descriptive representation for minority
voters180 then it’s possible racial gerrymandering doctrine has led to a small increase
in substantive representation for minority voters.181
But it’s possible there may be a difference between Congress, state legislatures,
and local government.182 Perhaps racial gerrymandering doctrine does little to
substantive and descriptive representation at the federal level—and the experience
of North Carolina’s congressional districts over twenty-five years may bear that out.
But perhaps racial gerrymandering doctrine reduces descriptive representation and
increases substantive representation in state legislatures (which was the focus of the
above-mentioned research). And perhaps it’s possible that racial gerrymandering
doctrine both reduces descriptive representation and reduces substantive
representation.183 Again, it appears that no one has tried to determine in any
systematic way which of these hypotheses are accurate. In the end, though, the
currently available evidence tends to indicate racial gerrymandering doctrine has
done little to systematically move minority substantive representation in any
particular direction.

177. See David Epstein et al., Estimating the Effect of Redistricting on Minority Substantive
Representation, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 499 (2007).
178. Id. at 506.
179. Id. at 517.
180. See supra Part II.B.i.
181. One scholar commented, “[t]his empirical literature concludes almost unanimously that a
tradeoff exists between descriptive and substantive representation.” Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at
1383.
182. To date, there seem to have been relatively few racial gerrymandering claims filed against
local governments. Of course, racial gerrymandering doctrine could still have an impact on local
governments even if no claims are filed because local redistricting actors operate in the shadow of
redistricting law.
183. Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at 1385 n.308 (“The tradeoff [between descriptive and
substantive representation] might also be more severe in recent years, since the Supreme Court has
rendered unavailable certain policies (like bizarrely shaped majority-minority districts) that make it
easier to achieve descriptive and substantive representation simultaneously. These are fruitful topics for
further study.”). It seems pretty unlikely racial gerrymandering doctrine would increase descriptive
representation. I am not aware of any successful litigation that alleged a white district as a racial
gerrymander that then resulted in the creation of a district that minority voters controlled. That said,
it’s possible that a racial gerrymandering challenge to a majority-minority district in which minority
voters have been “packed” could lead to a redistricting plan that unpacks those voters to create an
additional district that minority voters control. But such cases would seem to be rare.
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C. Other Potential Impacts
Thus far we have considered the impact racial gerrymandering was designed
to have by the Court’s own reasoning—reduced polarization of voters and more
inclusive representation by elected officials with a bit of anti-individual stereotyping
thrown in. We have also considered two other potential representational impacts of
racial gerrymandering doctrine—the descriptive and substantive representation of
minority voters. But other potential impacts of racial gerrymandering doctrine
include a constraint on partisan gerrymandering, an increase or decrease in voter
participation, a devolution of power from the federal government to state
government, doctrinal momentum toward a “colorblind” Constitution, more
compact districts, increased legitimacy, and fiscal costs.184
Constraint on Partisan Gerrymandering. To date, the Supreme Court has yet to
strike down a redistricting plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. While
the Supreme Court opened the federal courts to such claims in 1986,185 lower federal
courts have rarely struck down a redistricting plan on partisan grounds.186
Because direct claims of partisan gerrymandering are overwhelmingly doomed
to failure, racial gerrymandering claims could serve as an indirect check on partisan
gerrymandering. While a racial gerrymandering claim won’t directly result in a plan
being struck down as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, racial
gerrymandering claims function as a way to attack partisan gerrymanders from the
flank. In other words, partisans who lose a redistricting battle in the legislature may
well choose to use racial gerrymandering doctrine as a tool to undo the partisan
gerrymander—at least in some small part.187
Indeed, North Carolina’s experience demonstrates how racial gerrymandering
potentially operates as a check on partisan gerrymandering. In the 1990s, Democrats
controlled North Carolina and, unsurprisingly, drew congressional districts
gerrymandered in favor of Democrats.188 In the 2010s, Republicans controlled
North Carolina and, unsurprisingly, drew congressional districts gerrymandered in
favor of Republicans.189 In each decade, racial gerrymandering doctrine provided
the losing side with the ability to mount an indirect challenge to partisan

184. This list reflects my own thinking about what impact a federal judicial doctrine related to
redistricting might have and also reflects issues discussed in various academic articles related to racial
gerrymandering doctrine. Future researchers might add to this list.
185. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
186. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (describing history of litigation). The only
instance is a 2016 decision involving Wisconsin’s state legislative districts. See Whitford v. Gill, 218
F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wisc. 2016). That decision was vacated. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
187. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1486 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
188. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

First to Printer_Pitts (Do Not Delete)

2018]

RACIAL GERRYMANDERING DOCTRINE

10/3/2018 11:00 AM

261

gerrymandering during an era when direct challenges to partisan gerrymandering
were basically futile.190
But North Carolina’s congressional districting experience suggests racial
gerrymandering provides, at best, only the most limited check on partisan
gerrymandering. For starters, in the last decision involving the 1990s version of
District 12, the Court explicitly allowed North Carolina to justify the district as
motivated more by politics than by race. In other words, the Supreme Court
explicitly accepted partisanship as a defense to racial gerrymandering.191 And,
indeed, one study concluded that the 1997 remedial plan was more partisan than
the 1992 racially gerrymandered plan.192 Turning to the 2010 round of racial
gerrymandering litigation, the Court explicitly rejected an “it’s partisanship, not
race” defense of District 12—a decision that could be viewed as limiting the ability
of partisanship to be deployed.193 Even so, the remedial plan for the racial
gerrymandering violation seemed to be partisan gerrymandering business as usual.
The remedial plan resulted in ten districts generally safe for Republicans—not much
different, if any different, than before, and empirical research indicates little changed
from a partisan perspective.194
This experience suggests racial gerrymandering claims are unlikely to have a
systematic impact on partisan gerrymandering, but, to be fair, under the right
circumstances, racial gerrymandering doctrine could curb partisan gerrymandering.
There may be situations where a court finds a racial gerrymander and then the court
orders its own remedial plan.195 There may be situations where a court finds a racial
gerrymander, allows the state to redraw the plan, and the underlying political
dynamic has changed from one-party control to divided government (e.g., from
190. While technically partisan gerrymandering decisions were justiciable during this timeframe, as a practical matter partisan gerrymandering claims were virtually never successful. Supra note
186.
191. Supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
192. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 49, at 294–300 (“[T]he evidence is extremely
convincing that the 1997 Plan, in contrast with the 1992 Plan, was a political gerrymander.”).
193. Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1262, slip op. at 25–28 (S. Ct. 2017); see also Caroline A. Wong,
Sued if You Do, Sued if You Don’t: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a Defense to Race-Conscious
Districting, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1659, 1701 (2015) (“Equal protection precedents show that courts are
indeed willing to dismiss claims alleging racial gerrymandering if a state defendant can show that political
rather than racial considerations predominated in a challenged district’s design, even when racial
considerations entered the design’s calculus.”).
194. One measure of partisan gerrymandering is the efficiency gap, and one analysis shows that
the efficiency gap for the plan struck down as a racial gerrymander in 2016 is only slightly higher than
the efficiency gap for the remedial plan. LAURA ROYDEN & MICHAEL LI, EXTREME MAPS 6–7 (2017)
(noting that “both of North Carolina’s maps (the initial legislature-enacted plan and the redrawn plan
in 2016) [hover] around 20 percent in favor of Republicans” with an accompanying chart demonstrating
efficiency gap of both plans).
195. Evidence suggests court-drawn plans are less likely to be partisan gerrymanders than plans
drawn by political actors. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2131–34 (2018) (noting that court plans do not seem to skew the
efficiency gap in state plans but may skew the efficiency gap slightly in favor of Democrats in
congressional plans).
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total Democratic control of state government to a Democratic legislature and a
Republican governor).196 More subtly, it’s also possible that a redistricting actor
could be less inclined to engage in partisan gerrymandering just knowing that
another avenue for challenging a plan (i.e., racial gerrymandering doctrine) is
available to his or her political opponents. For instance, knowing that another type
of legal challenge is available might cause a redistricting actor to choose partisan
gerrymander Plan A over more aggressive partisan gerrymander Plan B. For all these
reasons, it would be helpful to have more systematic study beyond North Carolina’s
experience to better assess whether racial gerrymandering doctrine leads to less
partisan plans.
And there is another way racial gerrymandering doctrine could have partisan
implications. In a world where the Court allows the free pursuit of partisan
gerrymandering, the doctrine might operate as a greater restraint on Republican
gerrymandering than Democratic gerrymandering.197 As Professors Adam Cox and
Richard Holden recognized:
If Shaw and its progeny make it hard to assemble districts with large
supermajorities of African American voters, then those cases could
suppress the second-best strategy that Republicans might try to pursue
when the law requires majority-minority districts . . .
If a legal rule added a ceiling to the VRA’s floor [on minority
representation]—that is, a prohibition against assembling districts with
large supermajorities of minority voters—the ceiling could suppress the
second-best strategy for Republicans of packing minority voters. Some
might see this as a saving grace of the Shaw doctrine. Of course, if we are
concerned principally about partisan bias, such a rule might seem
particularly problematic. After all, Democrats are free under the legal
regime to pursue their optimal partisan strategy. Republican redistricters,
however, are already denied their first-best strategy by a legally mandated
floor. Adding a ceiling to restrict access to their second-best strategy would
further exacerbate partisan bias.198
In the end, it is possible that racial gerrymandering doctrine leads
systematically to less partisan redistricting plans. However, North Carolina’s
experience suggests the doctrine has little impact on this score.199

196. Evidence suggests plans drawn by divided governments are less likely to be partisan
gerrymanders than plans drawn by governments where a single political party controls the process.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 195, at 2119. Of course, divided government could produce a different
brand of partisan gerrymander—the incumbent protection gerrymander. Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 598 (2002).
197. To the best of my knowledge, during the 2010 redistricting cycle, no claims of racial
gerrymandering were brought against redistricting plans that would be considered to be Democratic
gerrymanders.
198. Cox & Holden, supra note 145, at 590.
199. Hasen, supra note 26, at 384 (“All in all, [racial gerrymandering doctrine] may help stem
some egregious gerrymanders, but there will still be plenty of ways for states to draw district lines for
partisan advantage without running afoul of the rules barring racial gerrymanders.”).
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Individual voter participation. Racial gerrymandering doctrine might impact
participation by voters. For instance, an African-American voter who resided in a
majority-minority district but is then assigned to a majority-white district after a
successful racial gerrymandering challenge might be less likely to turn out to vote at
the next election. Similarly, a white voter assigned to a majority-minority district and
then, after a successful racial gerrymandering challenge, finds his or herself in a
majority-white district might be more likely to turn out at the next election.200 These
differences could be attributable to at least a couple of things. First, a voter may
think his or her vote matters more (or less) when placed inside a district with a
majority (or a minority) of persons of his or her race or ethnic group.201 Second,
candidates might be more likely to mobilize voters based on the racial and ethnic
demographics of districts.202
One study that did not focus on racial gerrymandering in particular suggests a
change in district lines impacts the likelihood of individual voters to participate.
Indiana University’s Bernard Fraga found that:
 “For African-Americans, the immediate impact of being assigned to
a district with a black incumbent and/or a black majority is a
measurable boost in voter turnout.”203
 “White and Asian American registrants also participate more when
co-ethnic candidates are on the ballot.”204
 “[T]he combined effect of co-ethnic candidacy and assignment to a
majority Latino district does not increase Latino turnout on
average.”205
The paradigmatic remedy for a violation of racial gerrymandering doctrine is
for minority voters to be moved out of majority-minority districts and white voters
to be moved into a district that is no longer majority-minority but that still allows
minority voters the ability to elect a candidate of choice. For example, after the
successful racial gerrymandering challenge to District 12 during the 1990s, the
district went from about 53% black voting-age population (BVAP) to about 43%
BVAP while still allowing black voters to elect their candidate of choice.206

200. Bernard L. Fraga, Redistricting and the Causal Impact of Race on Voter Turnout, 78
J. POL. 19, 19 (2015) (describing the literature in this area and noting that “[m]inority candidates and
elected officials seem to stimulate co-ethnic turnout in some studies . . . but have little effect in other
work, except to depress turnout for the (non-Hispanic) white majority,” and observing that “[m]ixed
findings also appear when studying district demographic composition as distinct from minority
officeholding”).
201. Id. at 20 (discussing “empowerment theory”).
202. Id. at 21 (describing how turnout increases for minority groups could be “a response to
the ‘empowering’ mobilization activities of election-seeking politicians”).
203. Id. at 31.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 30.
206. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 49, at 258, 264 (providing statistics that District 12
in the 1992 plan was 53.34% BVAP and in the 1997 Plan was 43.36% BVAP).
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Combining the paradigmatic remedy with Professor Fraga’s research suggests
that the doctrine might negatively impact African-American participation and have
almost no impact on Latino and white participation.207 African Americans removed
from a district declared to be a racial gerrymander seem unlikely to be assigned to a
district that is majority-minority or that has a co-ethnic candidate or incumbent.208
If so, then it seems likely that African-American participation will decrease.209
Latinos do not appear to turnout more when placed in a majority-Latino district
with a Latino candidate so it seems likely moving Latinos out of an ability-to-elect
district will not change turnout for that group. With whites, they seem likely to be
moved from a majority-white district with a white incumbent into a district that will
either (1) be majority-white and elect a candidate of choice of white voters or (2) be
majority-white but still allow minority voters to elect a candidate of choice. In the
first circumstance, one would think that white voter turnout is unlikely to change
as it’s a lateral move. In the second circumstance, it might depend on whether a
white candidate appears on the ballot with a white candidate appearing on the ballot
keeping white turnout stable but with a white candidate not appearing on the ballot
potentially reducing turnout.210
However, there is a major caveat to this analysis. Professor Fraga’s research
focuses on individuals who have never lived in a district where their group
constitutes a majority or where there is a candidate of the same race or ethnicity. In
other words, his focus was on an individual being moved into a district where their
group is a majority or where there is a candidate of the same race or ethnicity.211 In
contrast, my analysis above in many instances discusses moving individuals out of a
district where their group constitutes a majority or where there is a candidate of the
same race or ethnicity. And it’s quite possible that a different context—being moved
out of instead of into a district—will have a different impact on voter participation.
Regardless, though, it seems unlikely that racial gerrymandering doctrine has
a large impact on voter participation. Why? Because Professor Fraga’s own research
acknowledges that shifts in voter participation due to changes in district lines are
“small in magnitude.”212 That said, it would be interesting to more directly study

207. I have not included Asian-American voters in the above discussion only because I am not
aware of any racial gerrymandering challenges being brought against districts that elect Asian-American
candidates of choice.
208. For instance, the districts surrounding North Carolina District 12 in both plans where
District 12 was declared to be a racial gerrymander were majority-white and represented by white
incumbents.
209. Additional support for this idea can be found in another one of Professor Fraga’s studies
where he found that African-American turnout is greater in the general election when African
Americans make up a larger portion of the electorate. Bernard L. Fraga, Candidates or Districts?
Reevaluating the Role of Race in Voter Turnout, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 97, 98, 105–07.
210. In most instances where white voters have been moved into an ability-to-elect district for
minority voters, at the very least a white Republican seems likely to appear on the ballot.
211. See generally Fraga, supra note 200.
212. Id. at 31.
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racial gerrymandering doctrine’s impact rather than the impact of districts more
generally.
Devolution of Power to the States. Racial gerrymandering doctrine might have
resulted in a devolution of redistricting power from the federal government to state
governments.213 An animating principle of the doctrine is that federal intervention
in state redistricting should be done with great care and much deference to the
States.214 And federalism—in the form of more power to State government and less
power to the federal government—seemed to be an overarching ideology of the
Court majority that created the doctrine.215
It seems counterintuitive that creation of a new federal cause of action to be
wielded against state redistricting plans would result in a devolution of power from
the federal government to the states, but it might have. The key here is the context
in which racial gerrymandering claims tended to arise during the 1990s. A number
of racial gerrymandering claims occurred in the aftermath of the Justice Department
using its power under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to compel the states to
create additional majority-minority districts.216 Indeed, this dynamic between the
Justice Department and the states is exactly what happened in relation to North
Carolina’s congressional districts in the early 1990s.217
Because racial gerrymandering doctrine deemed that Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act as interpreted by the Justice Department during the 1990s could not
support the creation of certain majority-minority districts,218 this may have had an
impact on the Justice Department’s later implementation of Section 5. In essence,
the Justice Department probably became less likely to intervene because of the
potential for racial gerrymandering claims. And, indeed, the Justice Department
explicitly acknowledged the need to comply with racial gerrymandering doctrine
when it issued redistricting guidance for the 2000 redistricting cycle.219 Moreover,

213. Power could devolve to local governments as well.
214. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (noting that courts should “exercise
extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district lines on the basis of race”).
215. As one commentator noted in 2002, “[s]ince the appointment of Clarence Thomas in
1991 . . . the Court has maintained a relatively stable five-justice majority—consisting of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas—committed to enforcing limits on
national power and to protecting the integrity of the states.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative”
Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 429–30 (2002). Those five
justices comprised the Court’s majority in Shaw v. Reno.
216. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 906–09 (describing the Justice Department’s efforts to get
Georgia to create additional majority-minority districts). For a description of how this generally worked,
see Michael J. Pitts, Redistricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1585–86 (2010).
217. Hasen, supra note 26, at 365 (“In practice, the [racial gerrymandering] cause of action
helped limit attempts by the U.S. Department of Justice in the 1990s to force jurisdictions then covered
by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to create more majority-minority voting districts.”); supra notes
19–25 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 921–27.
219. Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 5412, 5413 ( Jan. 18, 2001) (“[P]reventing retrogression under Section 5 does
not require jurisdictions to violate Shaw v. Reno and related cases.”).

First to Printer_Pitts (Do Not Delete)

266

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/3/2018 11:00 AM

[ Vol. 9:229

the Justice Department was much less active in using Section 5 against state and
local governments during the 2000 round of redistricting in comparison to the
1990s.220
However, with Section 5 being relegated to dormancy on the voting rights
landscape in 2013,221 racial gerrymandering doctrine no longer operates to increase
the power of states vis-à-vis the federal government by serving as a check on the
Justice Department forcing States to comply with potentially incorrect
interpretations of the Voting Rights Act.222 Instead, racial gerrymandering claims
operate as a tool for using federal judicial authority to restrict state redistricting
choices. Thus, absent Section 5’s resurrection,223 racial gerrymandering now may
function as a federal judicial usurpation of State authority. Moreover, even before
Section 5 was rendered dormant, racial gerrymandering doctrine curbed state
choices in areas not covered by Section 5.
Another consideration would be the federalism implications related to racial
gerrymandering doctrine’s impact on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. To win a
claim under Section 2 that seeks an additional majority-minority single-member
district, a plaintiff has to prove that the minority group is “sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”224 In
many respects, the doctrine of racial gerrymandering has been incorporated into the
requirement of geographic compactness.225 This doctrinal contribution could be
220. Hasen, supra note 26, at 365 (“Within a decade [of the creation of racial gerrymandering
doctrine], however, racial gerrymandering claims seemed to wither away, as the Court used other
methods to stop the Department of Justice from reading the [Voting Rights] Act too broadly.”); Pitts,
supra note 216, at 1587–88 (describing the reduction in the number of objections interposed by the
Justice Department). To be fair, some of the reduction in activity was likely caused by another Supreme
Court decision constraining the scope of the Justice Department’s Section 5 review. See Reno v. Bossier
Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); see also Pitts, supra note 216, at 1587–88.
221. Shelby v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
222. See Melissa L. Saunders, The Dirty Little Secrets of Shaw, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141,
146–47 (2000) (discussing racial gerrymandering doctrine and suggesting that the “upshot of all this can
only be described as a hostile takeover of the districting process . . . by the federal judiciary”).
I recognize many of the Shaw cases from the 2010 redistricting cycle emerged from state
actors arguing that compliance with Section 5 required redistricting along racial lines. See, e.g., BethuneHill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017) (challenge to state legislative districts in
Virginia). However, unlike the 1990s round of racial gerrymandering claims involving Section 5,
these choices were not made by States after receiving a denial of preclearance from the Justice
Department. Instead, these choices were made by the state actors themselves and there is little evidence
that the Justice Department would have blocked alternative plans that did not involve racial
gerrymandering designed to increase the percentage of minority voters in districts where minority voters
already had the ability to elect candidates of choice.
223. Technically, Section 5 remains alive and only the coverage formula that allows it to be
implemented is unconstitutional. See generally Shelby, 570 U.S. 52. It’s possible jurisdictions could be
“bailed into” Section 5 using Section 3(c), but that has not happened with any frequency. EDWARD
B. FOLEY ET AL., ELECTION LAW AND LITIGATION 98–99 (2014).
224. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
225. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916–17 (1996) (racial gerrymandering decision
describing how a district drawn with race as the predominant factor was not narrowly tailored as a
remedy for a potential Section 2 violation because the district was not geographically compact); see also
Hasen, supra note 26, at 373 (noting that League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
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viewed as enhancing state power in relation to federal power because it makes it
harder for plaintiffs to prevail against the state on a federal law claim. On the other
hand, racial gerrymandering principles that require compactness can also constrain
state choices for complying with Section 2 and can allow plaintiffs to prevail on
some claims that otherwise might have failed because non-compact ability-to-elect
districts do not count toward a state’s compliance with Section 2.226
It would likely be very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the federalism
costs and benefits (from the perspective of an increase in state power) of racial
gerrymandering doctrine. Put simply, it seems doubtful we will ever know how
much racial gerrymandering doctrine constrained the Justice Department during the
time when Section 5 coexisted with the doctrine. And it’s ambiguous whether
incorporation of racial gerrymandering principles into Section 2 is state empowering
or state constraining. But it seems like in a world without Section 5, racial
gerrymandering doctrine now likely acts mostly as a federal check on state
redistricting authority. In the end, it’s hard to know whether the doctrine has had
any significant impact on the federal-state power balance. At first, it may have given
greater power to the states. Now it seems probable that it is taking power away from
them.
Doctrinal Momentum Toward “Colorblindness”. Racial gerrymandering doctrine
could also potentially have an impact on moving toward a “colorblind”
constitution.227 Racial gerrymandering doctrine could serve as a waystation to a
regime where the government could virtually never take race into account when
redistricting. As one commentator wrote as the 1990s came to a close:
Perhaps [Shaw] is in fact effecting a significant change in [the Court’s] equal
protection jurisprudence, declaring that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids the state to use race in governing, absent truly extraordinary
justification, even when it is not subjecting any identifiable class of persons
to special disadvantage. There are certainly strong indications that at least
three members of the Shaw majority—Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas—would like to see the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence
move in this direction, and it may well be that they are using Shaw and its
progeny as a vehicle for doing just that.228

(2006), “appeared to merge aspects of racial gerrymandering claims into the section 2 analysis by
requiring district residents to have more in common than simply race to avoid liability”).
226. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 427–35 (refusing to give any
weight to a non-compact majority-minority district for purposes of assessing Texas’ compliance with
Section 2).
227. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision
in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1281 (2011) (“The Justices who vote against affirmative
action and other race-conscious civil rights policies are said to reason from a colorblind
anticlassification principle, premised on the belief that the Constitution protects individuals, not groups,
and so bars all racial classifications, except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing.”).
228. See Saunders, supra note 130; see also Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 49, at 229
(noting in the early 2000s that “[f ] or some members of the Court, any evidence of race consciousness
invalidates the infected district absent compelling reasons”).
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But if the doctrine was intended to be a way station toward a colorblind
constitution, it has yet to develop over the last twenty-five years. Indeed, if anything
the doctrine seems to have eased up on the colorblindness idea since the 1993 Shaw
decision. After Shaw, the doctrine developed in two ways unsympathetic to the
colorblind perspective. First, the doctrine clearly allows race to be a factor, just not
the predominant factor.229 Second, even if race predominates, a district can
presumably be saved by using the Voting Rights Act—a race-based remedy—as a
compelling interest.230 In short, the doctrine does not appear to have moved the
needle very far in the direction of colorblindness.231
More Compact Districts. Racial gerrymandering doctrine might create more
geographically compact districts. As the North Carolina congressional cases
demonstrated, the districts challenged as racial gerrymanders were, to put it mildly,
not exactly shapely.232 And North Carolina was not alone. Louisiana’s Fourth
Congressional district, successfully challenged as a racial gerrymander, was known
as the “Mark of Zorro” because it stretched 600 miles in a giant Z.233 Texas’ 30th
Congressional district, also successfully challenged, consisted of “narrow and
bizarrely shaped tentacles.”234 Indeed, part of the rationale for racial gerrymandering
claims in the first place was the notion that “appearances matter.”235
To the best of my knowledge, no one has empirically examined whether
successful racial gerrymandering claims lead systematically to more geographically
compact districts.236 Instinctively, one would think that a successful racial
gerrymandering claim does lead to more compact districts. For instance, just compare
a map of the North Carolina congressional districts passed by Republicans in 2012
that was declared a racial gerrymander with the districts passed in 2016 to remedy
the racial gerrymandering violation.237 The remedial plan certainly appears to be

229. Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1262 (S. Ct. May 22, 2017).
230. Id.
231. This discussion should not be taken to imply that a move toward colorblindness is a
positive development. Rather, a colorblind Constitution is just one of the potential impacts of racial
gerrymandering doctrine.
232. Supra notes 3–24 and accompanying text.
233. David S. Broder, Zorro in the House, W ASH . P OST , Mar. 27, 1994,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1994/03/27/zorro-in-the-house/6a1e8f78e8ab-4ec8-badb-60c0f05301a9/?utm_term=.78a5f993983e [https://perma.cc/P74F-UHPC].
234. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 965 (1996).
235. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993).
236. Many different ways exist to assess the compactness of districts. For a primer on several
of these measures, see Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Richard T. Holden, Measuring the Compactness of Political
Districting Plans, 54 J.L. & ECON. 493 (2007). A discussion of the various measures lies beyond the
scope of this article.
237. For a map of the districts declared to be a racial gerrymander, see the Appendix to the
Opinion of the Court in Cooper v. Harris, No. 15-1262 (S. Ct. May 22, 2017). For a map of the remedial
plan, see NCSBE US Congressional Maps, N.C. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ncsbe.gov/webapps/redistrict/uscongmaps.html [https://perma.cc/YWE5-A9KN]
(last visited Sept. 8, 2018).
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more compact.238 The changes to District 12 in the 1990s also made the district
appear a bit less bizarre.239
While it seems highly likely racial gerrymandering doctrine leads to more
compact single-member districts, it’s an open question whether compactness
amounts to a worthy goal.240 Perhaps compactness helps voters better understand
who they are voting for and perhaps helps make it easier for candidates to
campaign.241 Perhaps compactness also leads to greater overall public confidence
in the redistricting process. On the other hand, compactness may serve to divide
groups who have genuine shared interests. In the end, though, more compact
districts seems like a place where racial gerrymandering is likely to have made an
impact.
Legitimacy. A possible justification for racial gerrymandering doctrine is that it
attacks a potential threat to democratic legitimacy.242 As one oft-cited post-Shaw
article noted, racial gerrymandering doctrine might remedy a legislature’s “failure to
respect value pluralism in territorial redistricting” which “compromises the integrity
and legitimacy of the resulting institutions.”243 Thus, the doctrine might increase the
legitimacy of government.
It seems awfully hard, though, to measure political legitimacy. One potential
way to measure political legitimacy might be through public confidence. Presumably
one could take an opinion poll before a challenge and then, after a successful
challenge, take another opinion poll to measure public confidence in government.
But I suspect that public confidence in the legitimacy of government
correlates strongly with personal political preferences. Legitimacy is in the eye of
the political beholder.244 Indeed, measures of public confidence in electoral results
238. Mark Binker, New Challenge Says NC Congressional Maps Overly Partisan, WRAL.COM
(Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.wral.com/new-challenge-says-nc-congressional-maps-overly-partisan/
16038294/ [https://perma.cc/5NZ3-83LQ] (describing the remedial map as “more compact”).
239. Of course, though, a racial gerrymandering claim can be brought against any district—not
just a district that lacks compactness, Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (“parties alleging [a
racial gerrymander] . . . [are not] required to make a threshold showing of bizarreness”), so it might not
be that every successful racial gerrymandering claim leads to more compact districts.
240. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 143, at 484 (“Leading academic experts in redistricting have
long argued that this impulse [to recoil instinctively from willfully misshapen districts] reflects untutored
intuition, an instinctive response that careful analysis reveals to be unwarranted.”).
241. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 974 (1996) (describing how in a bizarrely-shaped district
“voters did not know the candidates running for office because they did not know which district they
lived in” (internal quotes omitted)). Prosser v. Election Board, 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. 1992),
states:
To be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district that has a reasonable
homogeneity of needs and interests. . . . There is some, although of course not a complete,
correlation between geographical propinquity and community of interests, and therefore
compactness and contiguity are desirable features of a redistricting plan. Compactness and
contiguity also reduce travel time and costs, and therefore make it easier for candidates for
the legislature to campaign for office and once elected to maintain close and continuing
contact with the people they represent.
242. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 143, at 502.
243. Id. at 503.
244. Id. (“[ I ]nstitutions legitimate from some groups’ perspective might not be from others’.”).
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seem to track whether one’s candidate wins or loses.245 If my candidate wins, the
election was sound. If my candidate loses, the election was rigged.
Placing this in the context of North Carolina’s congressional districts, I suspect
legitimacy would track along the following lines. In the 1990s, the Court’s
intervention against a majority-black district probably increased confidence among
whites and decreased confidence among African Americans (which
correspondingly probably increased confidence among Republicans and decreased
it among Democrats).246 In the 2010s, the situation likely reverses. The Court’s
intervention against a Republican plan increases confidence among African
Americans and Democrats and decreases confidence among whites and
Republicans. Of course, it’s also possible racial gerrymandering doctrine is such a
small item on the political agenda that such decisions fail to resonate with anyone
beyond a small cadre of political insiders. On the other hand, perhaps racial
gerrymandering doctrine increases overall public confidence by making districts
more compact and reducing the number of “bizarre” districts.
At bottom, legitimacy is a hard metric to pin down. However, it seems likely
racial gerrymandering doctrine decisions create more legitimacy for the winners of
the claims and less legitimacy for the losers.247 If so, it’s hard to know whether racial
gerrymandering doctrine accomplishes much when it comes to legitimacy.
Fiscal Considerations. Racial gerrymandering doctrine costs money. At the very
least it costs:
 Litigation expenses for plaintiffs.
 Litigation expenses for governments defending plans.
 Additional expense for legal and demographic expertise when
adopting a plan to assure compliance with the doctrine.
 Additional expense when the doctrine throws a plan out and a
remedial plan needs to be drawn.
It appears no one has studied the total additional government expenses related
to the doctrine. This should be done (and has been explored in other contexts, such
as voter identification laws).248 But it seems safe to say that racial gerrymandering
doctrine has increased monetary costs to the government.

245. Michael W. Sancer & Charles Stewart III, Voter Fraud Is More Believable when Your
Candidate Loses, LSE US CTR. ( Feb. 22, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2016/02/11/
voter-fraud-is-more-believable-when-your-candidate-loses/ [https://perma.cc/BE27-WL2S].
246. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 143, at 503 (“If the ‘highly irregular’ District 12 was actually
necessary to ensure a second representative of the black community in North Carolina, that community
might well view the districting plan that included District 12 as more legitimate than its alternatives.”).
247. Of course, if happy winners outnumber unhappy losers in some systematic way, then it’s
possible the doctrine leads to greater legitimacy (and vice versa to achieve lesser legitimacy).
248. See generally VISHAL AGRAHARKAR ET AL., THE COST OF VOTER ID LAWS: WHAT
THE COURTS SAY (2011), http://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2011/03/brennan-centercost-of-voter-id-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBT6-P6DQ]. Costs of compliance were also a
consideration in the debate over the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Janel
Davis, Costs Associated with Voting Rights Act Can Vary by Case, POLITIFACT GA. (Apr. 3, 2013),

First to Printer_Pitts (Do Not Delete)

2018]

10/3/2018 11:00 AM

RACIAL GERRYMANDERING DOCTRINE

271

D. Summing Things Up
This Part has highlighted several potential impacts of racial gerrymandering
doctrine. The court explicitly intended some impacts discussed in this Part when it
created the doctrine. The court did not explicitly mention other impacts but there
might be sub silentio intended or even unintended consequences. And it is possible
other researchers will uncover even more metrics on which racial gerrymandering
doctrine can be assessed.
In the end, here’s the scorecard. First, the best evidence would seem to be that
the doctrine has not accomplished any of the goals stated by the Court. Second, the
best evidence would seem to be that the doctrine may have led to either no losses
or very slight losses to minority voters in terms of descriptive representation and
little difference to minority voters in terms of substantive representation. Third, it
seems like the doctrine has not had much of an impact on partisan gerrymandering.
Fourth, it seems unlikely the doctrine has had much of an impact on individual voter
participation. Fifth, it does not seem like the doctrine has moved the needle much
toward creation of a colorblind constitution. Sixth, it’s possible the doctrine has
increased legitimacy and state government power but it’s also possible the opposite
has occurred, as neither of these metrics can be easily measured. Seventh, it seems
likely the doctrine has led to more compact districts and greater monetary costs for
state governments.
Assuming the accuracy of this scorecard, one might legitimately ask whether
the game of racial gerrymandering doctrine is worth it. If the best that can be said
for the doctrine is that is achieves prettier maps while costing the government more
money, then, in my view, the doctrine should be dumped. Of course, if the doctrine
is actually having other, positive impacts then that might change the calculus. But,
after twenty-five years of operation, the best evidence is that the doctrine does little
to improve American democracy and the burden should be shifted to the doctrine’s
proponents to demonstrate the doctrine has a tangible, positive impact on American
democracy.249
CONCLUSION
A final consideration in all this is whether racial gerrymandering doctrine is
distinctive within redistricting law in terms of whether it is actually achieving the
goals it was designed to achieve. Racial gerrymandering doctrine is unique because
http://www.politifact.com/georgia/statements/2013/apr/03/john-lewis/costs-associated-votingrights-act-can-vary-case/ [https://perma.cc/2WNJ-2RRQ].
249. In fairness, I suppose there could be a cost to scrapping racial gerrymandering doctrine.
The argument would be that scrapping the doctrine would necessitate overruling several Supreme Court
precedents. In doing so, the Court might lose some of its institutional credibility. And the loss of
institutional credibility might not be worth the gain of eliminating the doctrine. I’m not particularly
sympathetic to this line of reasoning. First, I think it’s very difficult to measure institutional credibility
and what the impact of eliminating a single doctrine might have on that institutional credibility. Second,
if the doctrine is not actually accomplishing anything of substance, other institutions (for example, state
and local governments) should not have to bear the costs of a useless doctrine created by the Justices.
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when it was created, the Court was relatively explicit about its goals. This is unlike,
say, one person, one vote doctrine where the Court was not particularly explicit in
what it was trying to accomplish.250 But it seems like racial gerrymandering doctrine
has not fulfilled its promise and many doctrines may not fulfill their promises—
whether those promises are explicit from the Court or implicit in what advocates of
the doctrine hope to achieve. To take an example from the one person, one vote
context, it does not appear that doctrine did much to “prevent those in control of
the redistricting process from drawing lines to their advantage” which was one of
its potential promises.251 And even if racial gerrymandering doctrine is
accomplishing something, it may not be accomplishing very much and
may demonstrate the limitations of judicial doctrine’s impact on legislative
redistricting.252
Finally, in writing this, while I have used the best available empirical evidence,
it seems like racial gerrymandering doctrine is ripe for further study, particularly
because I think it’s unlikely the Supreme Court will actually abandon the doctrine
anytime soon. And this may represent an additional reason the doctrine is not
unique because, once created, judicial doctrines may not be systematically studied
so as to be questioned at their core. For instance, it took about forty years for anyone
to take a look at the impact of one person, one vote on change in control of state
legislatures.253 And, as another researcher noted in the context of Section 2 racial
vote dilution “[a]lmost three decades after [the seminal Section 2 case of ] Gingles
was decided, not enough is known about the phenomena the case recognized or the
relationships between them.”254 In the end, perhaps researchers and courts need to

250. Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political
Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1307 (2002) (“The one-person, one-vote cases
are rich reservoirs of political philosophy. One must look beyond their texts, however, to capture fully
the justifications for equal population in districting.”).
251. Id. at 1351. I recognize that one person, one vote may serve as a constraint on some
extreme partisan gerrymanders. For instance, it prevents a political party from putting all of the
opposing political party’s voters in a single district. But such an extreme example is likely an outlier.
And one person, one vote perhaps created fertile grounds for more partisan gerrymandering because it
requires redistricting every ten years.
252. As one prominent set of scholars noted at the end of a study of one person, one vote:
The lessons learned from studying the political effects of one person, one vote are both
humbling and illuminating. On the one hand, lawyers and judges ought not exaggerate the
rule’s independent effect on the political system. Political actors usually find a way to achieve
pre-existing goals even under new legal regimes. On the other, new legal rules can seriously
exacerbate or help channel concurrent environmental changes. The difficult task for those
of us who analyze and advocate for such changes in the law of politics is to learn from these
judicial experiments so as to prevent perverse consequences the next time around.
Representing as they do the most substantial intrusion of the courts into politics, the oneperson, one-vote decisions deserve to be analyzed, even four decades later, so we can
discover increasingly relevant lessons about the consequences of judicial regulation for
legislative representation and electoral competition.
Id. at 1352.
253. Id. at 1332 (“As far as we know, no one has examined the effect of one person, one vote
on change in control of state legislatures.”).
254. Stephanopoulos, supra note 115, at 1327.
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comprehensively examine all redistricting doctrine to determine whether it meets
the needs of American democracy.

